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EMIL BRUNNER ARD HIS IDEA OF •CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY•
(Outline)
Controlling Purn ae·: To investigate and ori tioize Emil
Brunner•s idea o1 •Christian philosophy.•
Introductionl
.
A brief hiatorioal survey of the conflict between
reaso~ and revelation culminating in Barth and Brunner of the Dialectical School.

I. Brunner•s Theological Development.
A. Brunner•s early history.
B. Those to whom he 1s principally •indebted.
0. The three periods in his life and writings.
1. The period of criticism (1924-1928).
a. The period of conflict (1928-1937).
a. The con£1iot with Barth.
b. The conflict with the Oxford Group.
3. The period of personalism (1938 - - ) .
D. The definition of terms.
1. Dialectical theology.
a. Crisis theology.
E. The scope of this investigation.

II. Brunner•s Idea of "Christian Philosophy.a

A. The statement of his idea of •Christian philosophy.n

1. Why Christian philosophy is a fact.
a. Brunner's three uses of reason.
3. A dualism in this matter of revelation and
reason.
4. Reason is not evil,. al. !.I.•
a. Therefore the problem is one of •defining the si>llere of reference.•
b. Or it is the problem of the •specialist. 0
5. The •1aw of the closeness of relation."
a. The statement of the law.
b. The history of the law.
6. The •1aw of the closeness of relation• applied
to certain fields. (The Christian philosopher
in action.)
a. The State
b. CUlture.
aa. Science.
bb. Art and education.
7. Brunner•s tw~ conclusions toward achi~ving a
solutlon to the pr·oblem of Christian philosophy.
a. The break between revelation and reason according to Brunner occurs not between theplogy

and philosophy, but already between faith
and theology.
a. This transition is accomplished only at
the risk of one's life.
b. Therefore, the Christian philosopher
must always return to the Word.
9. The Christian can and must take an active
part in the world.
a. The Ohristian•s reason ha.a been set free
by faith.
b. Catastrophic events have demonstrated
the urgent need for Christian philosophers.
B. Criticism of Emil Brunner 1 s idea of •Christian philosophy~•
1. It is difficult to criticize Brunner.
2. Brunner has much of great value and significance to say.
3. The Lutheran teaching as regards the use of
reason and philosophy.
a. Luther and the Lutheran Oonfeseions.
b. 'l'he Lutheran dogmaticians.
aa. Theolog'J' merely above. not contrary to reason and philosophy.
bb. 'l'he •pure• and •mixed• art-i ales.
4. 'l'he value of Brunner•a •1aw of the closeness
of relation.•
5. This law can, however, be misleading.
6. Where we must break with Brunner completely.
a. For him the break between· revelation
and reason occurs between faith and theology, not between theology and philosophy.
b. For us the break will ever occur between
theology and philosophy.
7. Why for Brunner the break must occur already
between faith and theology.
a. He uses reason and philosophy in his theology in deciding just what is the Word.
b~ His basic dialectic~l approach is philosophical.
III. Brunner•a Principle of •Truth as Encounter."
A. This is our principal objection to Brunner.
B. Brunner•s main exposition of this theme is found
in The Divine-Human Encounter.
.
o. The history of the Object-Subject antithesis.
1. The Greeks.
a. The Roman Catholics.
3. The Period o~ Subjectivism.
4. The Reformation.
5. 'l'he Age of Protestant Orthodoxy.

6. Pietism.
?. Nao-Orthodoxy.
D. The solution.
l. I .t 1a not found betwee.n the two extremes.
a. It is found beyond t~e •xtremea in •truth
as encounter.•
E•. Why we object to BZUDDer•a •-truth as encounter•
·theme.
1. The Bible does DO~ esse.ntially define •117
concept of ·truth or fai~h.
a. Brunnerts definition .of truth or faith ls
derived philos~phically from:
.
a. Kierkegaard'~ ez,iatential philoaop~•.
b. Martin Buber's nz-Thou• philos~phy.
F. Brunner has again introduced philosophy i~to his
theology and in doing so ha.a violated h1s o~ law.
o. Conclusion: Brunner lacks the child-like faith
of a Samuel.
·

•

EbiIL BRUDNER AND HIS IDEA OF •CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY•
Introduction
Philosophy, 1t can truthfully be said, has been a proverbial thorn 1n the side of the Christian Church since the
Church's inception some nineteen hundred and fifty years ago.
Christ Himself had to entang1e with it when Be encountered
the Sadducees, and Bis awareness of the perpetual Armageddon between the wisdom of men and the wisdom of God is contained in His prayer:

•1 thank thee, 0 Father, Lord of heav-

en and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise
and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes.• 1 · St. Paul
saw philosophy raise its ug1y head among his beloved Corinthians and he minced no words in warning them that •the wisdom of this worll is f ooliahness with God. 113 • W
hen Epaphraa
brought the report that the Ooloasians were being enticed by
philosophy's fond allurement, Paul sounded the alarm:

Beware

lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit,
l. Luke 10:21 and Matthew 11:25,26.
I Corinthians 3:19.

a.

1

a

after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the
world and not after Obrist.• 3
But that was only the small beginning.

Apostolic

Fathers au.ch as Ignatius, Clement and Pa:pias., who expounded
Christianity around the end of the first century were thoroughly tainted with philosophical nQtions.

Indeed, Clement's

view of the relation between Christ and the Church did not
.differ essentially from that of the Gnostic Valentine.

fhe

Greek Apologists who followed were so saturated with Btoio
and Philonio ideologies that for most-of them Christianity
was little more than the highest philosophy.

Justin (b.

ca. 100) spoke as a true representative of that school when
he said:

•x

found this philosophy alone (Christianity) to
be safe and profitable.• 4 Origin (d. 354) was as much a
philosophical idealist as an orthodox traditionalist.

ltuch

more successful in breaking away from the adhesive tentacles
of Greek and Judaistic thought were Tertullian (d. oa. 230),
Irenaeus (d. ca. 202) and particularly Athanasius (d. 370).
Yet notable vestiges of the foreign element remained eveQ
in their thinking, speaking and writing.

NoD was St. Augus-

tine (b. 354) completely victorious in shaking off that
philosophical indootri~ation which had characterized the
educatio~ of his youth.

And thus the struggle continued.

By the time Anselm (d. 1109) appeared on the scene, the
3. Oolosaians 2:8.
4. E. H. notsohe,

A History At Christian poctr\ne, P•

4.

3

thorn of philosophy had become firmly embedded in theology's
aide.

Being constantly pricked, rubbed, irritated and never

cleanly cut away, it bad created 'for itself a calloused,
impenetrable cyst.

It had become such a pa.rt of the main

body of theological thought that Anselm and the rest of the
Schoolmen culminating in the mental son of Aristotle, Thomas
Aquinas (d. 1274), accepted it unheeitatingly with the whole
body of Ohristian doctrine.

They did worse than that. These

metaphysicians attempted to strengthen the whole body with
.the diseased portion.
with Aristotle.

They strove to bolster up Scripture

That briefly is the story of how the con-

flict came to cease officially within the confines of the
Roman Catholic Church.
But the peace was more apparent than real:

The Armaged-

don between philosophy and religion, between reason and revelation was destined to brea,k out again with unexcelled fury.
M&.rtln Luther was responsible for that and in the terrific
battles he waged against the unification of Ohriatianity
with philosophy, he came to loathe the Stagirlte with an
aversion expressed by him in strong terms like:
heathen master Aristotle,"
teller of fables."

•the blind,

•this wretched man• and •rancid

Even so Luther always maintained that

there was a measure of value in the study of philosoph,.S
and even some good in Aristotle.
5. Of. Luther, Works !lf.
Vol. II, pp. 146ff.

Almost at the same time

Martin Luther, Holman Edition,

4

0alvin and Uelanchton wrestled seriously with the problem
of philosophy versus Christianity.

Toward the end. of the

seventeenth century a forceful fifth column began to invade Protestant theology commencing with "the Father of
Deiem, 11 Lord Herbert Oherbury (d. 1648) cf England..

His

ranks Nere soon swelled with the addition of such influentials as John Locke and David Hume. • Deism and scepticism abetted the rising tide of rationalism articulated in

its earlier stages by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (d. 1716).
in his Theodice.

'l'h1s

work \Vas basically an attempt to dem-

onstrate the agreement of reaso~ with faith.
an

Leibniz had

able ally in Sernler of Halle (d. 1791), who is kno 11n a.a
1

''the Father of German Rationalism. 11

Things went frOL'l bad

to worse ~1th the propagandizing of Kant'• metaphysics of
ethics and his purely rationalistic morality as the end of
life.

In opposition to the frigid Xantian school, Herder

(d. 1803) and Jacobi (d. 1819) propagated their philoso-

phies of feeling and experience as the only basis for religion.

Thus they prepared the way for Schleiermacher (d.

1834) who, though he claimed to have banished philosophy

from theology, constructed a curious, contradictory system
of monism and due.lism, idealism and realism, rationalism ·

•
and mysticism, natur ilism and supernaturalism, theism and

pantheism, all in turn grounded on experience. 6 After
6. E. H. Klotche, M• cit., p. 314.

Hegel's (d. 1831) synthesis of theology and philosophy,
Feuerbach 1 s (d~ 1872) atheistic naturalism, Strauss 1 s (d.
1874) heralding of Darwinianism and Ritschl 1 a humanistic,
Neer.,.Kantian ethics, philosophy had so subdued and razed
thristian theology that in practically. all Europe the struggle between reason and revelation had ended.
further enemy left to fight.

There was no

ilhat was left of true Christ-

ianity had so retracted into its own protective shell that
little opposition could come from there.

~an didn't any

longer have to rely upon the fanciful mrths and the naive
God of Christianity.

Being a god in himself he was becoming

progressively better and would eventually effect his om salvation through his natural reason and understanding.

There

iVas, of course, a vast difference between this cessation of

hostilities and that of the Scholastic period.

The Scholas-

tic thinkers recognized revelation as valid and made it their
starting point in their theological system.
philosophy only secondarily.

They employed

Nineteenth century thought,

however, commenced aith sheer philosophy and in most oases
vehemently denounced revelation or politely forgot about it.
Thomism was a harm6nization of philosophy _with religion;
liberalism was

"8.

~armtniza tion of religion with philosophy.

It took two florld Ware to upa~t the great scheme of
human deification and send the liberals hurrying and scurrying hither and thither like a bunch of frightened, disillusioned rodents seeking escape from a ~urning harvest barn.

Renovated and more conservative systems moved in to take over.
John f. Clelland spoke of thts re~rkable reaction quite
ably in a recent review in The Jestminster Theological imar_Readers of ·t he Journal are well aware that the
older liberalism with its immanentistic theology,
its optimistic view of me.n, its activist.le depreciation of doctrine and its cheerful faith that we
could 'build Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant land' io no longer the fashion even in America
which tends to lag behind in its adaptation of new
theological styles. It has been oupplante~ by the
Dialectical Theology of Darth and Brunner.
Dialectical Theology has renewed the age-old conflict
betv,een pbilosophy and Christianity.

This new theology

does contain many orthodox elements, however it definitely
has not succeeded in eliminating all strains of liberalism.
It is as ironical as it is true that the struggle is at the
present time being waged most intensely in the very domain
of the Dialectical School between the two most predominant
fisurea:

Barth, of the University of Basle, and Brunner, of

the University of Zurich.

Professor Brunner recognizes that

philosophy has a destinotive, though limited, place within
the schen,e of Christian doctrine and action, while Barth
loudly and unrelentingly decries any attempt to put philosophy in the employ of theology.
Of the two Brunner appears at the present time to be
more widely known £~nd received than Barth. John McCreary
7. John P. Clelland, •A Review of Brunner•a Revelation
§:!!!l.Reafon,• in .fhl. neytminster Theological Journal, Vol. X,
No. 1, November, 1947, p. 57.

.,
is right in his observation:

•whatever may be the final

outcome in this historically significant debate , it can
hardly be doubted that in the Anglo-American minds Brunner has found more receptive attitudes for his position
than Barth has for his.• 8 The very reason why Professor
Brunner has found more sympathetic minds in the AngloAmerican scene is this that the average theologian of Britain and America still bears a. distinctly liberalistic hue,
a~d consequently finds it difficult to reconcile his sys-

' the ultra-dialectic, philosophy-intolerant, abtem with
solute transcendentalism of Karl Barth.

On the o~ber hand,

Brunner•s immanent transcendentalism allows a little something for man to exercise his rationalistic gums on, and
therefore carries a spirit much more akin to his own.

Per-

haps this is also why Dr. Brunner is often referred to by
the strict Barthians as •the Melanchtonian interpreter of
Barth. 119
It is impossible to measure the effect of the First
~,orld

~~r

on the theologians who had embraced optimistic

liberalism, and the case of Emil Brunner is no exception.
His whole theology has undergone a tremendous evolution
fr~m an optimistic, soc.ial humanism to a pessimistic semiorthodoxy.

The World Cataclysm of 1914-18 brought about

8. John McCreary, •Brunner the Theological Mediator,•
in Christendom, Vol. XII, No. a, (Spring, 1947), p. 186.
9. Vergilius Ferm, •Brunner•s Theology of Crisis," in
The Lutheran Church prterlY. Vol 3, (July, 1930), p. 322.
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the greatest single change 'in Brunner•s development, but it
was only the beginning.

As late as 1938-39, upon being in-

vited to lecture at Princeton Theological Seminary, he wrote
a frank letter to President Mackay in which he stated that
even 1935 was ancient history in his theological evolution
and intimated that he had abandoned positions of that bygone era, positions which denied the trustworthiness and
historicity of the Holy Goapels. 10 In the following I
shall attempt to trace in greater detail the intriguing
development of Brunner•s life and thought.

10. Donald G. Barnhouse, •some Questions for Professor
Brunner,a in The Presbyterian, Vol. OVIII, No. 18, (May 5,
1938), p. e.

9

I.

Brunner•a Theological Development

Emil Brunner, the famous Swiss theologian,, -was born in
Winterthur, Switzerland, on December 23, 1889.

Like Luther

before him, Dr. Brunner proudly returns to the roots of bis
life and says:

•I am deeply rooted in the Swiss soil, for

my people lived as farmers in the canton of Zurich for centuries.•11 However, his father was a teacher of Bible and
religion in the public schools, and be is said to have performed his task so well that neither Jews nor Catholics objected.

Again like Martin, Emil had a devout mother who

taught hirn the truth and reality of God by the time he was
three years old, so he declares.
About this time his parents moved to Zurich and there,
at the tender age of four, Emil saw his first social preach.
.
er in the form of Christoph Blumhardt (1842-1919), son of
the not~ble Johann Christoph Blumhardt (1805-1880), and leader of Social Democracy.

Brunner even to this day acknow-

ledges that the spirit of these great men who united spiritual poNer with social passion are at athe very roots of my
life. 1112 His second leader of religious socialism, Herman
Kutter, whose niece he later married, Brunner came to know
11. Dale Moody, •An Introduction to Emil Brunner• in ,nst
Review J!:.!!.4. Expositor, Vol. XLIV, No. 3, (July, 194?J, p. 312.
13. Ibid.

10

while 1n high school.

It was this great philosopher and

scholar, reader of Plato and the Church fathers in the original, and renowned preacher, who catechized young, impressive Emil.

It is he whom the ~hite-h•irad Dr. Brunner

still reverences with the words: "He we.a the greatest man
I have ever met in my life.• 13 · But student Brunner was
yet to becon1e acquainted with the very founder of Religious
Socialism in Europe.

Leonhard Ragaz became Brunner 1 s Pro-

fessor of Systematic Theology at Zurich.

•ae was our

Rauschenbusch - plus Carlyle, and he taught me more than
all my liberal teachers combined,nl4 thus Brunner still
lauds him.

Brunner furthermore credits him with instilling

within him the immeasurable worth of personality and community over against all impersonal systems like Hazism and
Communism.
Graduation from Zurich saw him change residence to a
boy's school in England, where the German speaking Brunner
taught French to learn English.

He

is to this day a brilliant

trilinguist to the extent that be bears a typical English
accent when he converses in that tongue.

This linguistic

ability enabled him to keep in touch with every important
theological ~evelopme~t.

The outbreak of .iorld War I forced

him to. leave England and to become a soldier in the Swiss
army.

After the war be held a pastorate in Obstalden for

some years.

Here he discovered two writers who, all in all,

13. ll21d,., p. 313
14. Ibid.

11

almost had as much influence on him as Karl Barth, namely,
St. Paul and Boren Kierkegaard.

The Danish Socrates, he

yet declares to be •the greatest Christian thinker of modern times.• 15
But 1917 and his first •evangelizing together• with
Karl Barth and Edward Thurenysen produced the most catastrophic tU1'n about face.

Although then already did he

have his first argument with the Professor from Bnsle, he
hastened to pay lasting tribute to him as

1 the

renovator

of_ our theology, 11 and in a review__he did nQt hesitate to .
assert Ba~th's Epistle

.12.!wl Romans to be a •water-shed

in rnodern theology• J Heedless to say, these young "crisis
1
theologians• 'iiad little difficulty breaking into prominenoe
when the

11

idea of progress• became a farce and a delusion

during the First World War.
The rest of Brunner•s story is contained .in the volumes
and volumes of his writ\ ngs which can easily fill a shelf
three feet long.

In addition to St. Paul, Ohristian Social-

ism and Kierkegaard, he acknowledges indebtedness to Irenaeus and Augustine, Luther and Calvin, and finally to the
Continental personalists.

Kant, Heidegger and Fauerbach

n

15. Ibid. Brunner quotes and refers to Kierkegaard
infinitum in all his writings, particularly in Revelation
and Reason. As to the great esteem in which he holds his
iiiought, ·gt. also the remark: u ••• the very significant obser vations of Kierkegaard, whioh have never been properly
valued by anyone . . . . 11 Emil Brunner, Bexo\atJon~ Beaeon,.
p. 186, Note: 6.
16. FQr explanation of 1 orisis theology• £t. infra, p. 32t.

have influenced him in a negative way, while Overbach and
Bultmann and Buber directed him along more positive lines.
We can hardly improve upon Dale Moody, who in hla excellent article, •An Introduction to Emil Brunner,• distinguishes three distinct periods in Brunner•s life and
writings.
11

He characterizes these periods as follows:

(1) the period of criticism in which Brunner searches out

the weaknesses of modern theology; (a) the period of conflict in which he goes beyond Barth and the Oxford Group;

-

and (3) the period of peraonalism in which Brunner comes
into his own. 1117
(1) lb.!!. Period,!!!. Orit1c1sm (1914-1928).

The first

notable product of Brunner 1 s pen, his doctoral dissertation,
Symbolism J!:!!SlReligious Knowledge (1914), was a firm attack
on the false intellectualism and scholasticism which, he
declared, was by no means confined to the Middle Ages but
had equally wrought havoc in philosophical and theological
thought.from Kant to Bergson.

But w~ must clearly note al-

ready that his solution of the problem is not a disregard
of all k!lowledge.

The solution rather lies in this that he
who seeks must turn to •a deeper source of knowledge.• 18
His criticism of the many impersonal elements in modern civilization began in a mild enough fashion taking the form of
17. Dale Moody, Jm.• .£.U•• p. 314
18. Barth and Brunner, Natural Theology;, trans. Peter
raenhal, p. 71, quoted in Abid.

13

an address at the Aarauer Studentenkonferenz in 1919.

Here

he m&intatned thnt personality, as understood in the light
of the Gospel of Ohrtst, has been crushed.

He continued his campaign for personallem in a book
called Exnerience, Knowledge and Faith (1921).

·xn this work

he severely took to task the intellectual schemat!cieta ~ho
had brought experience and knowledge together apart from
faith, who on the basts of their philosophy of the identity
of God with man had so~ght to escape the need of a ttediator.
His Habilitations Vorlesung on the occasion of his becoming
nrivatdozent in 19aa at the University of Zurich contained
another violent criticism of mechanical, still intellectualisn1.

The name of this work is The Limits

~

Humanity, and

it is most significant in this resp~ct thet it contains his
p1•inm.l outline for the relations between ·revelation and
reason, transcendence and immanence.

~ll,ereas most theolo-

logical thinkers of the optimistic school had bound their
religious philosonhizing to the immanental alone, Brunner
now suggested, ~s a result of the collapse of culture and
civilization in World·War I, that it is really the tr~nscendent sphere which limits humanity.

'l'he

Absolute which

calls a halt to humanity and which is "the crisis of the
human situation, the ground of faith is God.• 19
In 1924, _
a.t the age of thirty-five years, Brunner

19. Emil Brunner, Die Grenzen der Hwnanita.t, p. 15,
quoted JJui.., 315.

14

became Professor of Systematic a~d Practical T"neolog-f at
Zurich.

This same significant year saw Professor Brunner

fire the biggest blast thus far in his theological career.
It was aimed directly ~t Frederick Schleiermaoher and his
a ttempt to substitute religious experience for revelation.
Brunner•s criticism declared thu.t Schleiermacher, "The Idol
of L~bers.lism, 11 with his motto:

11

Feeling is all, name and

sound 1s smoke, 1120 had L1ado religious consciousness and
specula.tiva rationalism one and tlle same and had entirely
re1noved the need for the ~'iord of God.

The Doctor followed

up this initial discharge with a barrage of lesser volumes
like:

Philosonhy !:D5! Revelation, Reformation .!!!1i,Romanticism,

and 1h!, Absoluteness .9,.[ Jesus.

Because of some friendly crit~cism from Barth's direction, Brunner now boarded a more constructive train of
thought, but still could not relinquish altogether hie penc'ha.nt for er 1 tic izing modern theology.
day.

HiG next two important volumes,

Ile hasn't to tllia
The

Philosophy 2'_Rel1-

Jll.2!!.and The Mediator appeared almost at the same time (192?),
of which the former is prolegomena to the l atter.

In the

former he places greater and more thorough emphasis on the
relation of revelation to reason, religious experience, history of religion, and the Bible than ever before. He points
out the important distinction botffeen philosophy and

a.o. En1il Brunner, All!. Mystick

ibid.

und

das Wort. p ..

5, quoted

15

revela tion in the following words:
To philosophize is to reflect on the mental
grounds, with the assumption that ultimate
validity belong to the complex of grounds and
consequences developed by the na tural reason.
Christian faith on the other hand involves recognizing that this complex has been broken
into by revelation. It is on this revelation
that the affi~fatione of the Christian faith
are grounded.

In!. ~ediator takes up the story from here and clarifies just what is meant by breaking into this complex of
grounds of natural reason.
meant by revela tion.

It defines also just what is

Here Brunner distingllishes between

s pecial and general revelation.

Special revelation is the

cllief cluu·a.cteris tic of a.11 popular and social religions.
Gener al revela tion, on the other hand, belongs to the sphere
of philosophica l religion, which speaks of an "essence of
r eligion."

Concreteness is absolutely essential to special

revelation, while to general revelation it is purely acoider1tal.

Th.to n1eana that the Christian religion is more in-

tirna tely conn~cted \'11th popular religions because it is
very concrete.
Christ.

It is the historical revel ation of Jesus

Yet it differs vastly from popular religions also

because it is characterized by uuniqueneas" (Einmaligkeit).
Here a.re Brunner• s

01m

,,orda:

"The Incarnation of the rlord

is in its very eosence a. unique event, and this Incarnate
21. Emil Brunner, ..th!, Philoaopby gt Religion, p. 13. Trana.
A. J. D. Farrer and B. L. " oolf, German title: Rel1g1onsnb11osoph1e evangelischer 'l'heologie.

16

,iord can only be one, or it is nothing at all. naa Modern
theology has obliterated this important distinction between
general and special revelation, and has nlao forgotten especially that the Christian revelation comes from beyond
this mundane creation by a particular, miraculous act of
revelation.
(a) The Period ,2'.

Conflict (1928-1937). By now Dr.

Brunner had become a famous theologian, and thus he spent
the major portion of 1928-29 fulfilling lecture invitations
e.t tlle Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church at Lan-

caetel', Pennsylvania., and at various universities throughout Hollra.nd.

In his last series of lectures he began to

accentuate Christian ethics and ~the other tae.k of theology,•
namely, anthropology.

Ke.rl Barth became impe.tient almost

immediately, and now began that ~truggle which was destined
to lead to a complete break between the two Swiss dialectical
t heologians.

The conflict began in earnest when the Pro-

fe ssor of Zurioll in 1929 wrote an ar1;icle entitled, •The
Other Task of Theology.•

He followed the line suggested by

Pascal and Kierkegaard and ma.de human consciousness the
point of contact for the Gospel.

ihe Uord is never preached

to a vacum but to a self-conscious hwnan being, anci thus the
Ohristir1on theologian

ZDUl: t

come to recognize anthropology as

a legitin1a.te study, while realizing, of course, tha t the

aa. Emil Brunner, The Mediator, p . 240. Trans. Olive
iyon, Germaa title the same.
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message of the Gospel mu~t al~ays come first.
A lecture NOn the Orders of God," delivered February
3, 1939, went still further and boldly grounded Christian
ethics on the natural orders of Cre&tion.

Out of this pre-

liminary lecture grew his monumental tome, lh§. Oomrnandrnent
.!mi~ Orders _(l932~23 which P~ofeaaor Whilhem Pauck of
The University of Ohicago hes referred to as the grea test
theological work published in the last generation.

It is

a brilliant, thought-provoking, w1dely discussed prenente.tion of the problem set for ethics on the relation of the
co1nma11d of God to the natural ordere of society.

This is

Brunner•s reply to the lamentation of the liberals that the
discussion of ethics has been sorely lac~ing in the Dialec- .
tical Theology.

Dr. Brunner goes to great lengths· in eG-

tablishing Christian ethics on the foundation of the Christian doctrine of the orders of Creation (Schoepfungsordnungen),
which he defines accordingly:
By this we mean those existing facts of human
corporate life which lie at the root of all his~
torical life as an unalterable presupposition,
which, although their historical forms may vary,
are unalterable in their foUDdamental structure,
and, at the same time, relate and unite men to
one another in a definite way.24 (Emmples
would be: marriage, the family, labor, the state,
culture, etc.)

Brunner•a conclusion is that if God speaks to men through
33. German title: Das Gebot und die Ordnungen: Entwurf
einer proteetantisch-tiiiologischen Ethik. trans. Olive ~yon
under the title: la!! Divine Imnerative.
24. Emil Brunner, The Divina Imperative, p. 210.
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these natural orders, then the immanence of God in the
spirit of man and in nature is a problem which Christian
theology is forced to face.
Thia volume will play a significant role in the second
chapter of our discussion, •srunner•a Idea of 'Christian
philoeppby' 1 1 8 because it gives an excellent demonstration
of the Cllristia.n philosopher 1n action.
It can be said with few reservations that it was this
book that made the dialectical, crisis theology famous outside of the Continent.
serves:

Professor J. HcOreary correctly ob-

uxt was in the Brunner of .'nl!!, DivinA Imperative that

the British and American theologians first began to welcome
to any appreclable degree the crisis theology that had
emerged on the Continent in the opposition of Barth to Herman."25 But, needless to say, it ,ma anything but welcomed
by Karl Barth.

Because of its very presupposition that

God does speak through nature, and that man can perceive,
even though in sin 1 the revelation of God in the natural
orders, the Professor of Basle considered it worthless,
yea, worse than worthless.

Yet Barth managed to contain

his impatient silence until Emil Brunner issued lY, lju.eation

.2!..th§. Point

,2f Contact

in Theology. in which he definitely

relates discontinuity to continuity and states that man's
formal (in opposition to his material) personality still
35. John mcCreary, JE.• cit., p. 210.
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retains the

Imago R!1,

has the capacity for perception and

is the point of contact for the Gospel.
In seething vexation Barth could contain himself no longer and let fly with both barrels J Three articles burst
.forth almost simultaneously:

•rate and Idea in Theology,•

"Theology and Present Day Jlan, •
Missions.•

and "Theology and Modern

In the first he stoutly rejected any polarity

between philosophy and theology.

In the second and third

he loudly decried any attempt of the modern missionary to
f i nd a •point of contact• for the preaching of the Gospel.
A suboequent article of equally violent nature even accused
Brunner of lapsing into a Thomistic natural theology.

Brun-

ner could not let his pen lie idle either in the face of
such invective.

He poured forth articles defending his

ffnatural theology," and in the last of these he demanded
that present day theology find its way back to a more sound
natural theology.

Such an order Barth could only interpret

as adding grievous insult to severe injury, and so be shouted
in angTy :cetaliation with the curt and caustic .!!.!ll!!I He explosively declared that to grant man any "susceptibility to
the ~ord of

r-oa,•

and •addressability,• and •verbicompetence•

is to deny explicitly the Reformation doctrine of .!.2J4S!1-

,a.

Again and again he emphatically declaimed that the sub-

jective point cf contact (Anknuepfungspunkt) is created
anew by grace.

To say anything lees than that, as Brunner

was doirig, was to render worthless the doctrine of total

20

deprav1 ty.

The cleavage between the t~,o Sw1.ss theologians

was complete and so the battle still goes on toda.y~
Emil Brunne~•s second period of conflict concerned itself with Frank Buchman and the Oxford Group, but the outcome of thi~ conflict when compared to that with B~rth is
as different as night and day because the attack on the Ox-

ford Group resolved itself into a joyous reconciliation
with Brunner•s becomtng the theologian of the group.

Let

t _h at not minimize the seriousness or the severity \'11th
which Brunner precipitated the initial attack.

f hen he

went to lecture at Princeton and there found faculty and

.

students deeply engrossed in all sorts of Oxfordian spiritual awakenings and experiences, he denounced this "error of
Methodism" ,vith the greatest vehemence.

He outright.l y con-

demned it ae a "vitiating influence upon orthodox thin~ing" that could only result from a •deplorable misundersta.nding0 of Romans VII and VIII.•as The O:xfordian awakenings, in a. most disasterous fa.sh-ion, turned the individual
fr om the 'lord of God to religious experience.

And at that

time Professor Brunner had little room for religious experience:
Therefore faith must cling solely to the Word,
but not to experience. Experience comes from faith,
but faith never comes from experience. The principle of Christian life is not experience but the

as.
by

Emil Brunner, l'l!!, Theology 9!, Crisis, p. 21, quoted
Dale Moody, .sm,. cit., p. 323.

a1

"9?gap-

~ord of God, which can only be believed
(Underlining my own.

not be experienced.

A second contact with this revivalistic group came
when he lectured at King's College at the University of
London in 1931, but it only increased the fervor of his~
tipatlly.

Yet a. third contact was forced upon him ithen the

movement began to stir the very foundations of Zurich, and
directed him finally to attend a hcuse party in Ermatinger.
Then a.11d there, almost with the suddenness a.nd forcefulness
of an Old Testament vision, it came upon him that this vigor.ous movement had definite possibilities for resuscitating
the :11oribund Church about him.

True enough, there was much

or nonsense and superficiality in it that did not escape his
oritioal eye, but where else had there appeared sucll a hope-

ful si~11 for the revival of the Church which was f a iling
abominably to satisfy the masses• pangs of hunger for the
eternal bread of life?

This is abundantly certain the.t af-

ter his espousal of the Ox.ford Group, Brunner made

&

sharp

about face from his earlier assertions that had made revelation and religious experience mutually exclusive.

This is

quite evident in his subsequent production entitled, l'.11!.
Church and the Oxford Group, \Vhich is his word of congratulation to the group and commendation to the world for the
great role the Group had played in the revival of the Church.
37. Ibid., p. 64, quoted

..121!1•

aa

Therein he states quite revealingly:
According to the lew Testament teaching, faith
creates experience and not the contrary. But f a itll
s!Qll create this experience, this new thing which is
to be perceived in experience. -He who tes chea
otherwise does- not remain in the tradition of the
New Testament. 3 S
A

vast difference is already discernible here bet~een Mfaith

~

create this experience, this new thing which is :per-

ceived in experience,M and his earli~r statement before tbe

American students at Lancaster:

-•The principle of tbe Christ-

i an life le not experience but the nord of Cod, which can
onlx be. believed mid oannot
my own.)29

be

exner\enced.•

(Underlining

This chasm between hia· earlier and l a ter beliefs gre~
even more pronounced ~hen Professor Brunner 1 s fourth large
volume appeared, his monumentel J:!!n.!!!.Revolt. 30 In chiefly attending to the possibilitien of setting forth a Christian antlmopology, the author also stresses the relation or
revelation to human experience.

Indeed, here f a ith and ex-

perience become so intimate that Brunner declares the Bible
procla ims no other faith than that -:1hich is exoerience, 1. e.
11

a real meeting with the real God. 1131

The ~iord of God nev-

er la.ya claim on man ape.rt froin hie experience.

It is only

38. Emil Brunner, The Church ,m the Oxford Oroun, p. 55,
quoted ibid., p. 324.
·
29. _2!. footnote no. 27.
30. Trans. Olive Wyon. German title: ~ l.lensch !!l , 1der-

sprugh.

31. Emil Brunner, K!:!!. .!!!. Revolt, p. 205.
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in this way thAt man recognizes h1s 11 actual state, as he
really is, 1133 hie contradiction before God. Karl Barth
was

only one among 1nany who well suspictoned that with such

sta tements Brunner es ma.king some r ~ther elaborate amen.de
for his severe criticism of ex.p erience in earlinr writings.•
These suspicions ~ere soon confirmed by Brunner•s own confession:
For the grave injustie:;~hich undoubtedly has
been done P1etism during the past twenty years,
I !ael it a duty, ac one of those more or less
responsible, to make some amends. It is precisely v1e - the group of 1dialectic' theologians
who several years back still enjoyed some unity
in being fellow combatants - who have every
reason to remember Pietism with the highest grat i tud.e.33
·
hen ~ve compare this prese!nt embracing attitude toward
e:tperience ,., 1th the antagonisrn aroused by bis firs t introduction to the Oxford Group, ·,-:e may r.:ell sllout:

quantum

nautatus !2, illo J and quietly add that loVP. a t £1.:rs t sight

may not be the strongest love after all.

Incidentally, this

newly found love of Brunner•s only accentua tes Barth's antipa thy for his theological opponent.
(3) la!. Period
two

11

m: Pers·onaliem

(1938 ---).

While the

B1 s 11 were taking in hand the reins of Reformed theolo-

gy in Switzerland and directing it along renewed paths, also in

Sweden theology was undergoing a critical eta te of agitation
32. l!l!,g,., p. 306
33. Emil Brunnsr, The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 39,

trans. A. ~- Loos. German title: Wahrheit !:!!. Begegnung.
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and transition.

Because Brunner had demonstrated himself

as being a competent, authoritative and popular guide
. through the ~shed out beds of the very fluid modern theology, he was invited to deliver the famous Claus Petri
lectures at the University of Upsala in the Fall of 1937.
The President of the Foundation at that time, Professor A.
Runestam, suggested .that Athe relation between the objec~
tive and the s~bjective in the Christian faithA34 be ma4the theme of the lectures.

This suggestion struck a B1DP

pathetic chord in Dr. Brunner•s soul the like of which was
rarely struck before!
For years Brunner had been fighting an intense battle
on t wo fronts, one against the false subjectivism of modernism, and the other against the false objectivism of
.

orthodoxy.

Both ru~noualy perverted the true conception

of the Biblical tradition in their over-emphasis of their
respective extreme.

But now he could, with this volume,

make a permanent "break-through• into the realm of the personal.

But let Brunner speak for himself:

This theme has proven to be an extremely valuable starting point for reflection abo~t the
Biblical concept of truth - reflection which led
to the insight, important -alike for theology and
for the practical work of the Church, that our ·
understanding of the mes sage of salvation and
also of the Church's task is still burdened with
the Subject-Object antithesis which originated
in Gr$ek philosophy. i'h~ Biblical conception
34. Ibid., p. 7. (foreword)

of truth is, truth as encounter. 35 (Thus the
German title of his book m i'lahrheit ala Begegrmng.)

Astonishing results were achieved when Brunner applied
this conception of Biblical truth to different phases of
life and practice, as he himself asserts by declaring that
if his thesis be correct, •then indeed muah of our thinking
and action in the Church must be different from what we
have been accustomed to for oanturiee.• 36 That his new
proposition for truth has made quite an impression already
is attested to by Dale Moody of Southern Baptist Theological Semina-r y who announces:

•Thia slender volume, read

by the undiscerning as just another book, is likely to
become a turning point in the interpretation of truth.• 37
Much more will be said about this significant writing
in Chapter III of this discussion, for exactly the intriguing usubject-Object antithesis 0 and his •divine-human
encounter• principle will be the topic of that section.
A year later saw the famous Swiss again sail for
America, escaping from the plaguing Barthian controversies,
and bearing an invitation to lecture at Princeton Seminary.
But there a controversy broke out in the Presbyterian
Church engaged in chiefly by the fundamentalist Dr. Barnhouse and the more liberal President Mackay of Princeton.
35. Jlwi.
36. Ibid.
37. Dale Moody, .211• £l1., p. 326

as

Thia controversy proved to be more violent and intolerable
than the seething theological cauldron from which Brunner
had fled. 38 So, the very next yea.r he returned to his
beloved Zurich just as World War II exploded ln Europe.

The

trying war years saw him busier than ever with preaching
and with reconcerted efforts to apply the Christian faith
to the eoct al order, especially in the light of the peculiar problems presented by the war.

Yet he took time to

follow through on bis Upsala lectm:-es.

Hineteen hundred

forty-one saw another tremendous volume of thought and penetration go to the press, hta scholarly Revelation and B!!!,son.39 The first part of this book is a reiteration of
much of the thesis presented rud1metarily in lAI., Mediator,
1. e. a thorough discussion of natural theology, revelation
in the Creation and historical revelation.

Natural theol-

ogy is the Catholic doctrine that man in his sin ~nd. without direct Biblical revelation can come to a valid knowledge
of God.

This sort of theology the Professor of Zurich com-

pletely disavows, and Barth praises him for it.

But they

come to blows again when Dr. Brunner begins discussing man
as a •theonomoua 0 being, a being related to God who is God's
human partner in the process of revelation.

Of course, man

38. For a detailed presentation, .sz.t. D. G. Barnhouse,
•some "1Uestions for Professor Brunner n and J. A. Mackay,
•some Answer.a for Dr. Barnhouse,• in +he Presbyterian, Vol.
CVIII, No. 18 1 (~ay, 1938), pp. 8ff.
39. Tr.a ns. Olive Viy.on. .German title: Offenbarung l!!!l, I!.£
nunft.

a,

cannot even attain the truth of the revelation of Creation, which includes sin, by himself.

Only in the "unique•

bre~king through of the Word made flesh into the realm
of the earthly, which is the historical revelation, can
he come to comprehend the revelation in Creation and hia
sin.

Thie makes possible the free man, the man ruled

only by agape. the J!i!!!. whose reason !!. completely

w. l!:n·

Whereas in the poaitivistio, rationalistic metaphyaicist
"reason arrogates to itself the right to define the whole
range of truth from the standpoint of ma.n,• now reason operates from the legitimate standpoint of God, and "within
the truth of revelation all that reason knows and recognizes falls into place.• 40 The proper placement of the
Christian's reason makes Christian philosophy not only po11sible but essential and. unavo1d.&ble.
The reader has correctly surmized already that it is
this work of Brunner 1 s which will play the most important
role as this dissertation .advances, particularly in the
nexv chapter whtch will concern itself solely with Dr.
Brur1ner•s idea of •Christian philosophy.•

In this book

he for the first time clearly sets forth in some detail
his Christian philosophy devoting an entire chapter to this
theme alone, though the theme has bobbed to the fore many
times in nearly every one of his previous works.
40. Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 213.

as

Two years later, 1943, Brunner ~ut to practical test
his theeie presented in Revelation .!DSl, Reason in another
highly significant volume which he simply called Juetica.41
Deploring the fact t:tiat •the Protestant O.hurch is ao unsure of itself in questions of the social order, economics,
law, politics and international law anc1 ••• (that) its
statemento on these subjects are so haphazard and improvised that they fail to carry convict!on,• 42 Dr. Brunner
strives to restore some sense to all the chaos by defining
and applying justice.

Here we definitely see the Christ-

ian philosopher in action as he seeks to discover the why,
wherefore and whereunto of law, politics, economics, family and society.
Emil Brunner•s last great contribution to the world
of theological literature thus far, and perhaps the beginning of his finest, appeared in 1946.

It was the first

volume of his proposed four vo·lwne systematic theology
bearing the title, .lw!, Christian Doctrine~ God. 43 After
years of impatient delay, the Swiss theologian bad finally
found time to follow up• bis principle which had blazed
a trail for the complete rethinking of the Christian faith,
"truth as encounter,u set forth first in The Divine-Buman
Encounter.

The task of theology la also given particular

41. Trane. llary Hottinger. German title: Gerechtikeit. The
English edition bears the title: Justice Ys! the Social Order.
42. Ibid •• p. 1. (Foreword)
,
43. German title: Die Ohristliche Lehre !:2!l Gott, Zurich,
Zwingli-Verlag, 1946.
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emphasis in this production.

In a few words• tha t task is

to see to it that Christian revelation keeps abreast of the
times.

To achieve that end there can be no final, absolute,

once-for-all system of Christian doctrine.

Dogmatics must

remain entirely flexible so that it can perform the task of
"a mediator in between worldly science and a supra-worldly
testimony of faith.•44 By this method Christian revelation
can maintain its station unblushingly and remain vital and
valid for any scientific world view that future generations
may evolve.

Thus today, Emil Brunner - prolific writer,

brilliant lecturer. stirring preacher - has taken bis etand
and is zealously striving to reinterpret, theologically and
philosophically what he thinks Christianity must be ma.de to
mean for his community and for the whole world at large if
the Church would endure.
It may be woll to discuss two terms ~hich a.re inseparably united with the names of Barth and Brunner, which do
not, however, make a direct debut in this dissertation,
namely, "dialectical theology" and its inunedia te descendant,
•crisis theology.•

All other terms necessitating elucidation

will be defined as they are introduced into the discussion.
The dictionary does not assist us a great deal in defining "dialectic," but we know that the word is derived
44. !l!!sl·, p. 77, quoted in Dale ~oody, .sm,•

.£11., p. 338.
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from the combination of two Greek words:/>,-.· and J:,,,~.
These t wo words mean •to speak between. ~ Dialectics is
just that, a skillful method of •speaking between. 0

Two

affirmations are made, the one. ia contradictory to the
other, and yet they do not cancel each other out because one
oan always •speak between• them or withhold speaking at all.
Neither of two paradoxical statements can be accepted to the
entire exclusion of the other because there is never such
a remaining statement that contains only a •no.•

Every oon-

tradiotory statement, except such naive oontradiotions as:
"this paper is white• and •this paper is black, 11 embodies
the possibility of a •yea• at the same time.
it most intelligibly of all when he says:

Barth puts

"There is never so

decisive a yes that it does not harbor the possibility of
a no.

There is never so decisive a no that it is not li-

able to turn into a yes. 11 45 An exarnple pure and simple
are the two seemingly appositional statements:
a bad man,• and •ur. Xis a good man."

•ur. Xis

Yet everyone well

realizes that neither .in the first case is Mr. X always
bad, nor that in the second case is he always_ good.

So

when all is said and done, we conclude that Mr.Xis both
bad and good.

Thus a dialectical situation is one about

which we must say yes and no at the same time in order to
45. Karl Barth, Das Wort Gottes Jm!lJUA Theologie, p. 75,
quoted in Theodore Engelder, MThe Principles and Teachings of
the Dialectical Theology,• in Concordia Theological Konthlv.
Vol. VII, No. 4, (April, 1936), p. 249.

rightly understand and explain it. 46 Brunner tells ua
how and why this principle must be introduced into the
theological field:
I have often been asked what the 'Dialectical
Theology' is really driving at. The question can
be easily answered. It is seeking to declare
the i4iord of the Bible to the world. • • • Wha,t the
1ord of God does is to expose the contradiction
of human existence, thus in grace to cover it •
••• It is only by means of the contradiction between two ideas - God and man, grace and responsibility, holiness and love - that we can apprehend ~he contradictory truth that the eternal God
enters time, or that sinful man is declared just.
Dialectical theology is the mode of thinking which
defends this paradoxical character, belonging to
faith-knowledge, from the non-paradoxical speculation4of reason, and vindicates it age.inst the
other. 7
This principle of the dialectic is derived plainly
,1,]4 Kierkegaard.

He introduced the practice of frankly

failing to complete the third aide of the Hegelian triangle.

Against this same optimistic, triwnphant and ration-

alistic attainment of synthesis, both Barth and Brunner, in
forming their theological systems, find it wiser, more realistic and only truthful to the Biblical and Reformation tradition to be content with an open, unresolved balance of
apparent truth against apparent truth.
The dialectic is their very raison d'etre, for through
it the individual Ohriatian must remain alive, responsible
46. Paul L. Lehmann, "The Direction of Theology Today,•
in Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol. III, lo. 1, (November, 1947), p. 8.
47. Emil Brunner, ll!!. i7ord !U!!! ~ World, pp. Sf, quoted

JJwl. ' p. 8.

.
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and a man of personal decision in any crisis &1tuat1on
that 1night a.nd will arise in life and practice.

To Kierk-

egaard the Ohurcb of Denmark wae the institution par excellance into which tho Christian might flee for refuge,
and there do collectively what he would not ·d are to undertake as a responsible individua.l.

Saye Professor Kwin of

Asl>ury Seminary concerning Kierkegaard:

11

'l'he primary re-

1 lgious problem appeared to him to be that of iaolat\ng

the individual and conf~onting him with himself as personally culpable, and with the 'Absolute Paradox' of the entry of eternity into time in the Incarnation.n 48 In other

words, the worst thing that the Church can do is to resolve
all the pa.rad.oxes, answer a;l.l the questions in legalistic
dogma, take everything in hand as an organiz&tion so that
~r. Ohristian becomes complacent, self-satisfied, with not

a care in the world.

Mr: Christian must be made to face

his crisis, primarily that crisis which arises when God
meets him and he meets God, but also the many smaller crises that are bound to •ppear in Christian living.
11

ings:

'l'he word crisis, 0 according t ·o Brunner, "has two meanfirst, it signifies the climax of an illness; second,

it denotes the turning point in the. progress of an enterprise or movement. 0 49 'l'he heavy mark of accentuation falls
48. Harold B. Kuhn, 11 The Problem of Human Self-tranacendancc in the Dialectical Theology,~ in The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. XL, Ho. 1, (January, 1947), p. 8.
49. l!:mil Brunner, Theology .2f Orisia, p. 1, quoted in
Paul L. Lehmann, Jm.• .sz.!1., p. 6.
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upon the •turning point,• the lesser on the •climax.•
Brunner states that the course of events in any individual life or in a cultural epoch are continually moving
toward one climax after ·another.

In the crucial moment

the person confronted must face the climax and make the
radi~al turn about face required in his life if his life
or culture about him is to have any meaning.

The respona-

.!l!ll person makes the decision and moves forward.
cludes Brunner:

0

Con-

What it all means then is that our atti-

tude to the demand for faith is not a matter of reason,
whether positive or negative, but of personal decision.
The value of critical reflection lies in the fact that it
necessitates personal decision.•

(Underlining

lllJ'

own.) 50

The general purpose of the remainder of the paper and
the particular purpose of Chapter II will be to investigate
Brunneris idea of •ohristian philosophy• in theory and in
practice.

Following out his doc~rine of man's reason we

shall see why Christian philosophy is not only possible but
absolutely inescapable since the C~i~tian must live in the
State and play a role in culture, science and educ~tion.
cannot avoid doing so.

Part of Brunner 1 s thesis is due

great commendation and pr~ise, while other aspects of it
are by no means invulnerable to adverse criticism.
50. Emil Brunner, The Philoaonby of Religion, p. 188.

Be

The third and final ohapter will conaern itself with
our principal exception to Dr. Brunner•s thesis.

This

principal criticism is directed against the result that
theologian-philosopher Brunner obtained when he bepn to
investigate the age old problem, •what is truth?", that
in particular, Christian truth.

1••·

His conolusion is that

there can be no real Christian truth except where the Philonic Subjective-Objective antithesis is cast out ent.irely
and the •Biblical• •divine-human encounter• principle is
employed.

~e maintain that in projecting this •truth as

encounter• principle as a Biblical one, Brunner is oversteppi~ his bounds~ introducing reason into revelat1on
and thus violating one of his own basic laws.
Of course, this attempt is little more than an introduction to an immense mind which has produced some classic
tomes exhibiting keen thought, deep penetration aDd scholarly research in a host of subjects.

Bot only has Brunner

achieved great respect from the alert theologian, but he
is also well recognized by various authorities not of theological bent.

As John McCreary points out:

•Br~er has

found sympathizers among those who have difficulty in accepting his •transcendentalism' - who, working in the fields of
social psychology, ethics, and soc!~l philosophy, realize.
nevertheless the numbing effec-t of a mer·e description of
'•hat is done in various oultur·e s •.• 51 For the student
51. John McCreary, .sm,.

9.U.. , p. 330.
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who would like to probe deeper into Brunner•a thought
there are such interesting and profitable subjects as:
the Word, faith, revelation, natural theology, Imago Dei,
mysticism, anthropology_. ethics, the State, marriage, the
family, justice, economics and Christian psychology and
sociology.

On all of these Brunner has much of great

value to say.
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II. Brunner•s Idea of Christian Philosophy
•Christian philosophy ia a faot , • 1

With this rather

bold assertion Emil Brunner opens Chapter as of Revelation

.!DSi Reason, entitled:
Philosophy.•

•The Problem and Idea of Christian

It is a fact for two reasons:

first, be-

cause a great number of philosophical concepts which a
philosopher e~ploys today in his thinking and speculation
have been created by Christian philosophers.

One simply

cannot think of the history of philosophy in the 11est,
of thinkers like Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz, without being aware of the tremendous role th~t faith played in
the formulations of their systems.

Secondly, because no

honest Christian theologian, no matter how hostile he might
be to philosophy, can operate without philosophical concepts that have been coined for him by the secular metaphysicians.

Therefore, •the synthesis of philosophy and

Christianity, in some way or other, is a fact that cannot
be undone; it is part of our desti:ny.•3
The Christian philosophy becomes more evident and more
necessary when the theologian is forcefully reminded that
the Bible does not furnish all the answers, in spite of the
fact that Barth tries to maintain that it does.

8

1. Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 374.

a.~-,

p. 375.
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be ea.ye, "as tha mass&!}e ot Jesus Ch1"1st, revea ls to the
1 culturecl 1

man 01" uoCiu.an tb.e poesib111ty 11 t h e necess.1.ty 11 the

me..in 1nr- 11 t he run~e, and the snlution nf the ta3k of culture. n3

In atern oppos1tlon to th1R Burt'11an view that Christian rovels tion '1us t h e

r 11•st,

last and '>nly c ord even in matters of

secula1• knr)l'!lGdf.8 and 1n the ordering of the r r,1•ld. ( the St6.te
t oo) 11 Brunnor cteclares:

can anyona sart ously maint:ail'I that all questions
i n mathematics, physic~s, biolor-;1' 1 ond 1:ist1"011omy o.re
1 answarad 1n the Word of God•,
Does anyone seri1>usl7
content th.at in the future, instoacl of turnin::~ to
h.'uclld fol" geometry, to Galileo f or physics, to 'Lyell f'or r,eology, we n1ust tu.rn instead I for everyt h ing, to t ho Holy scriptures!
'l'lw na1 vete of cuch a v1<¾W is excelled onl~f by its sheer

imposs 1b111ty bee use ~ee&Use r ntlonal activity is alreudy

presup osed in the -ramm tica l unders tQnd1n r of' tha Bible.
Her e already t h ere mu"t be lo@ical th1nk1nn and tra ining
1n the use of ideas.

Hence this exclusive, o.rb1tra ry em-

ph~ sis ~n tho Bible us the source of everythin3 does not
solve but only confuses the problem set up _by Cqristian
philosonh.y.

To toss the v1hole problem out of the tsindow

1s no s olution.

Barely hns one done thet '\':hon lle stumbles

a ns.inst the hurd t1•utb oc;a:.1n: "Reason is reu.son; t he1•e is
onl y one reason • • • •

J\11 ,;;ho wish to th1.nk 1:.t all must

think according to tho 1•ules of this, onB ret!son, \·; h1cb is

exactly the soma for e ll; if'·a mo.n does not think in this
3. Karl Barth, Evangelium
1b1d. 1 p. 377.
--:(. ~ • • P• 378.

~

B1ldunp,, P• 10, quoted 1n
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way, he. is not

I thinking'

at all; he is •merely indulging iil

fantasy. 115
•Reason• as employed by Brunner in his writings needs
elucidation.

Nowhere does he clearly. define -in so many

words just what he means by reason, but through a typological analysis we can perceive that he uses it in three general sensea. 6 He uses, it first in the sense of man's general capacity for thought, for speech and for communication.
It i~ identified also au the humanum, or the natural endow-

n1ent of intelligence that God bestowed upon ma.n at the time
of his Creation.

The human being can never loose this es-

sential oharacteristio which is a refiect1on of the divine
image in him, for to do that would be to cease to be a hu-

man creature.
feature.

Even the Fall did not eradicate this primary

•The imago, in the first sense of the word (formal

sense as distinguished from material), cannot be lost, for
it distinguishes man as man, in his nature; it is true of
it, manet .!!!1!, peccato adhuc.• 7 This first interpretation
of man's reason is vastly important because it is this primal reason that makes man responsible and gives God a
"point of contact" in man.

8

Uan 1 s reason therefore is al-

so the cause of his eternal unrest •••• It ls precisely
the activity of the reason whioh is the unmistakable sign
5. Ibid., p. 375.
6. Outlined by D. D. Williams in •Brunner and Barth on
Philosophy,• in l2!!!, Journal At Religion, Vol. XXVII, No. 4,
(October, 1947), p. 243.
7. Emil Brunner, ml• .s;,U., p. 69.
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that man comes from God.• 8 The human creature differs
from the other creations of God as rooks, trees and animals
precisely because he has this •point of oontaot.•

He could

not enter the community of believers without it.

Ao Brunner

expresses it:
One does not have to have a great mind to be a
person who truly believes and loves; but if one
has no mind - as an idiot - one cannot even believe. The presupposition for the understanding
of the Word of God is understanding in general,
the understanding of words, in the general, purely human sense. What that poor creature which,
in the extreme case, so far as we know, has not
a spark of intelligence means in the Family of
God, we do not know; we only know that in this
life it cannot become a believe , because it
cannot understand human speech. 9
In Brunner•s second use of reason, the classification
has broadened out to include all the activities and principles of •reasoning" as they are demonstrated in logic,
science, ethics and metaphysics.

All these practical appli-

cations of reason grow directly out of man's humanum. Under this second grade of reason Brunner would also rate our
God-given common sense • . As before cited in the case of those
"radical fideists 11 who would make the Bible the source of
everything sacred and secular, this second use of reason is
as inescapable as the first. \ihat intelligent Ohristian man
doesn't think according to logical rules, use his common
sense, acce·p t the established finding of science, attempt
to apply bis Christian learning and experience to practical

a.

D.1d.• .a. p.

ss.

9. EiiU .arunner, At!!! in Revolt, p. 341.
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problems of moral living, and ask the proverb1al question,
•what is truthn?

The Ohr1atian theologian mUAt and does al-

ways employ this second use of reason.

•Even in a definite-

ly Christian theolog1cal anthropology there can never be any
question of depreciating the reason, of hostility to reason,
or of setting up a plea for irrationalism.

If Ne must choose

between two evils, then w1thout stopp1ng to reflect for a
moment we shall choose to be rat1onalists rather than 1rrationalists.•10 When the theologian in all honesty and humility employs his reason here, he is not distracting from or
violating his faith, for, "It is not reason as such which
is in opposition to faith, but only the self-sufficient reason ••••

There is war between faith and rationalism, but

there is no war between faith and reason •••• ■ 11
But since already here in his natural thinking about
ethics, ontology and the meaning of life, the human person
1s coming to grips w1th questions and decisions of absolute
truth and value he is approaching Brunner•s th1rd UBJ of
reason.

It involves the natural man's attempt to arrive at

absolute truth about existence and about God apart from the
transcendent knowledge of revelation.

This is philosophy

in Brunner•s usual sense of the term, and is, of course,
strictly verboten.

Philosophy - Theism, Naturalism, Panthe-

ism and :t4aterial1sm - sets up its own system in the place of
10. lJllJ!. , p. 343.
11 • .l,ej4.
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God's, makes human reason supreme, and consequently worships
an idol of its own fashioning.

The majority of Brunner•s

work and writing takes the form of a scathing polemic against
this third type - this impersonal, abstract reason.
abstract reason,• he declares,

1

1

The

is that which is already

severed from God, the falsely autonomous, falsely independent reas,)n, the reason of the man whose whole self has been
isolated.• 12 And though Mthe human mind may find elevation
and satisfaction in this rational theology; it will not find
in it the •truth which niakes us free•. 013

The entirety of

his constant battle against philosophy can be sum,ried up in
Augustine's classic words, "Si comprehendis, non , i l l ~ . •
Just as one arrives at no solution to the problem of
Christian philosophy by rejecting it altogether and acknowledging no validity of truth outside Scripture, neither does
one find any solution by denying the validity of all truth
inside Scripture.

W~ile we all (nearly all) agree that the

multiplication tables and the laws of logical thought a.re
the same for all men, Christians and pagans alike, we do not
agree that all bold the same doctrine of ;nan and bis responsibil.ity.

There is definitely a singula.r Christian doctrine

of freedom and responsibility, of existence, of 1narriage,
and of the calling.

Therefore even the rationalist has to

admit that he comes into decided conflict with a host of
1a. ~ - , p. 430
13. Emil Brunner, Revelationmd Reason, p. 363.

other thinking human beings when be flatly discredits all
revelation and strives to solve the above problems by rationalistic methods alone.

At the same time, "Even the most

doughty champion of the Biblical truth of revelation a.s the
sole solution of these 'ultimate• questionsnl4 must confess
that there are areas· .of secular and formal kno~1ledge s.nd
activity, as logic and m·~tllematics, where reason alone 1s
competent.

'!'he Bible simply does not furnish information

in these areas.

In other words, there is a distinct dual-

ism present here, the extre1ne roles being played by the
"fideist 11 on the one hand and the rationalist on the other.
It is plainly not satisfactory to try to solve the problem
by forming a false monistic syn_thesia between reason and
revelation, philooophy and theology.
The question that confronts Ohristian theology then is
not whether reason has any rights or whether reason has any
authority to judge the false and the true, for it certainly
does.

God has created a world.

In this world there are im-

personal, objective truths like the truths of mathematics
and science which are by no means eliminated by the revelation of Jesus Christ.

Besides these there are the impersonal

truths which are not concerned with "things. 11

All these lat-

ter impersonal truths constitute tbe ,1orld of ideas, the intellectual world.

8

14 • .ll?J&., p. 379.

These are not merely aids to our thinking,
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but principles which hav.e their basis in th~ thoughts of
God.

~e are meant to use them also, and they are not above
us, but under ·us. n15 Of all the creatures known to us God ·
gave to man a.lone the oapa.oity to know this ·u orld as He es"This capacity we call 'the
povrer of rational perception'. 1116 God has revealed Himself
tablished it in His Creation.

not only through the Word but also in the Creation.

On the

basis of this primary revelation in the Creation and passages like, "The earth has He given to. the children of men,•17
man bas be~n given the power to know and dominate the Orea-

t ion by means of his reason.

When Adara and Eve were in the.

Garden and ate Qnly of' the fruit of the allowed trees there

was no problem because there was no discrepancy between their
reason and God's revelation.
duced by the Fall and sin.
spective.

The problem was first introSin threw everything out of per-

Sin set up a •peculiar, irrational barrier" to

God's original revelation.

Reason, transgressed its bounds

and ate of the ·forbidden fruit.

It retu.aed to respect the

holy -center :and attempted to partake of God's divine mystery
thus exalting itself beyond measure.

·S in created the ter-

rific problem between reason and revelation with which every
Christian and particularly every theologian must now wrestle.
15. Ibid., p. 379.
16. Ibid., p. 381.
17. Psalm 115:16.

Because reason is not evil mll:Jl!!., but only in so far
as it is affected by sin and thus is conat~ntly in danger
of overstepping its boundaries, 'the problem of reason versus
revelation is mainly one of delimiting the autonomous reason.
It is against the reason that v1ould

make

absolute and ulti-

mate claims that the Christian must constantly fight.

Con-

sequently, the problem finally resolves itself into •one Qf
defining the sphere of reference.•18 Or it might also be
called the proble1n of the

II

specialist. 11

I~o Christian how-

ever deeply his faith is grounded in revealed Scripture will
seriously maintain that the Bible supplies all or even adequ&te informa tion in the fields of special or expert knowledge.

'l'he Word of God cannot be a substit~te for what the

specialist

11

knows of himself" about the making of machinery,

about counterpoint, about the 1ntric~ies of semantics, or
about balancing the powers of the State.

•In all these ques-

tions. reason is suprerue, and reason alone. 11 19
However, it is impossible to sever even this expert
knowledge from the whole context.
again.

Here the problec arises

All these specialists callings a man 14ust carry on

as a man, and hence they cannot be isolated COinpletely from

the context of his entire life.

Where his entire life is

viewed there theology or faith must also be viewed •. The
problem does not arise from the specialist knowledge as
18. Emil Brunner, Revelation .!mi Reason, p. 380.
19. ll!W,.
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such, but from its integration into the whole.
must listen to the voice offaith, the Word
given to faith.

or

Here he
revelation

The nub of the matter is ultimately this:

"'l'he prol>lem of Ohrsitian philosophy io the problem of the

interpenetration of the two Dpheree, of the secular and
knowable, and. the supernatura1 and revealed. It is the question of the limitations of the specialist.• 20 As already
stated, it is because of sin only that the question ·arises
at all, that the specialist must be limited.

How does Dr. Brunner propose to lirai t tlle specialist
affected by ein and thus solve the problem of the interpenetration or the t i,o spheres?

He does that

by

the for-

mation of a clever proportion&l thesis called the w1aw of
the closeness of relation. 11 21 He leads up to the formation of this thesis by declaring again that no theologian
thus far known to him h&.s held that our matherna tical knowled8e or our formal logic ie affected by sin.

However, on

the other side of the fence, all are a.greed that our knowledge of God - as regarding our personal relation witll Him is most deeply affected

by

sin.

is the nature of sin itself.

Indeed, ·that broken relation

But even stn· and faith, the

\'lrong and right relation with Goci, presuppose the e111ployment
of formnl reason.

Now thio state of affairs cannot be in-

dicated by drawing any absolute: line ot dema.rco.tion, but
20. Ibid., p. 381.
21. Ibid., p. 383.
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only by the proportional statement:
The nearer anything lies to the center of existence where we a.re concerned with the whole,
that is, with man's relation to -Cod and the being
of the person, the greater is the disturbance of
rati~nal knor.ledge by sin; the farther anything
lies from this center, the less ls the disturbance
felt, and the lees difference is there betwe~n
knowing as a believer and aa an unbellever!aa
In theology this disturbance reac~as its maximum extension,
in the exact sciences it attains its minimum and in the
sphere of the formal it hits zero.

Consequently it ie a

meaningless and a useless application of the adjective to
speak of a "Christian• mathematics.

On the other hand, it

is extremely important and absolutely essential to speak of
•Christian• conceptions of freedom, the good, community,
and st.~11 mo~e of God.
11

In each of the above cases cited

0hristian" suggests the manner in which the rational know-

ledge in these fields is to be corrected by the Christian
faith, but the degree of that correction varies proportionately.

In the example of God it ceases to be a correction

altogether and becomes an absolute substitution of revelation for reason, while in the case of mathematics (the formal) the correction disappears. completely. 23 This •1aw
of the closeness of relation•

aa.

also makes us aware of the

-1hld.

23. ""Intbe sphere of ma.thematics this is true only 'I/hen

one is concerned with mathematical problems pure and simple •.
As soon as one begins investigating the iounda.tions of these
problems, then •once again the sphere of knowledge is affected
by the mysterious background of the whole, 11 which 1aeans God
and sin.. !lll5i., p. 383. liore will be said about this indispennable observation when we criticize Brunner•s position.
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existence of several problems ~hich lie amid\78.Y," in which
p•.irely rational knowledge and faith interpenetrGte and even
cooperate, as, for e:zn;i1ple, in the s pheres of l l..v1 1 the State.
histo1·y, time, et ceter&...
la':!'1"

There is no "Christian science of

in the same sense tha.t there is a

11

Cbz istian theology.•

Yet because law involves justice and juctice is inceparable

from the Just end therefore a.lso :from the theologica.l idea
of divine justice, one cannot escape tile influence of revelation in this midw&y sphere.

Aga.ip, howe,rer, the more formal

tlle thinking of the jurist the less w-111 111s conclusions be
affected by revelation, and the less will be the difference
between the Christian and the non-Christian juristic conclusions.

RcLt1.ono.l imot1ledge neods modification only to the

extent and degree that it is concerned with human beings as·
responsible persons.

•In other words, the more we are con-

cerned ~1th the world, n·the world, the more autonomous is

the reason; but the more •;te are concerned wi tll the ,.,orld as
God's Creation, the less autonomy is left to reason.n 24
Emil Brunner has almost f~o111 tho beginning of bls career 'b een in,restiga.ting th,~ relation bet,veen reveli:.tiou and
reaoon, and the role thQt the Christian must play in culture
and the ·:rorld.

Upon becoming priva.tdozent a.t the University

of Zurich in 1923, he issued The Limits .Q!.Hwnanitv.

It con-

tained the rudi1ne11ts.ry outline of the ~ffini ty between reason

and revelation, and it grounded culture in the transcendent
24.

l!llJ!• • P• 384
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sphere of God.

!h!. Philoeouhv of ReliP:ion (1927) continued

from there allowing even a Chr-ietian philosophy of religion
in a secondary, limited sense·.

J. ore

important to our theme

iE the embyro of the Christian philoso,,he:r \'Illich tr e find

taking ehape in the conclusion of the volume:
But, as faith is not sight, and as in feith we
only overcome the contradiction that trammels human existence if at the same time we endure it, if
we persist in it •in the body•, for this reason the
believer does not withdraw from~ rational life that
aims at knowledge and culture. He takes hie part
in then!, the:, furnish the ma terial of the activity
by which he has to prove himself an a Christian,
a member of the ecclesia milit&ns. 5
In The ~ediator tbe embyronlc Christian philosopher continues his slow, steady growth.

He makes uite an impreti-

sion already in the last chapter of the work tvhere Brunner

di&cusses the laym~n in Christian action.

The actual birth

of the Christian philosopher takes place i n ~ Divine .!m.nerative (1932) in conjunction with Brunner•s primal use

of the "la,, of the closeness o~ relation. 11
by a slightly different na:!le tb~n:

centre. 11 26

This la:, ,1ent

the law of the ''personal

The Professor of Zurich employed it in this

volume on ethics to solve the enigma of the Christian's
participa tion in the State, in culture, science, education
and in church polity.

The next major work of Brunner•s,

~.!n,Revolt (1937), viewed the law of the •persQnal centre•

as.

Emil Brunner,:!!!!. Philosophy 2t Religion, p. 190.
26. Of. Emil Brunner, I!!!l Divine Imoeratiwe, pp. 490,
495f, 506, and 54?.
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as applied to one particular area; namely, Christian anthro-pology.

In this ~phere the Christian philo•opher discovers

a wide interpenetration of reason and revelation, hence both

are valid and must cooperate.
The Christian doctrine of man maintains that,
although it understands man jrom the point of
view of the truths of revelation, which are ~t
accessible to experience, yet it does not in any
way contradict what can be known of man in and
through experience; on the contrary, it incorporates this knowledm1 gained by e·x perience· into
its rightful context;.:J7
Once again the relation between revelation and exp~rience,
or reason, works itself out when t .h~ law of the apersonal
centre" is brought into proper focus.
The more closely we are concerned with the
centre, with man's personal relation ~\th God
and man's personal being, the greater will be
the infiuence of unbelief upon the higher life
of mind and spirit. T-~e further we move away
from this central point the less evident does
it become·, and it is therefore still more difficult to rec.o gnize it. If a person studies
anatomy or physics it will be impossible to
tell from his scientific work, pure and simple,
whether he is a Christian or an unbeliever.
But hi°a faith or his unbelief will come out
ve~y clearly in his way of thought and life as
a man.28

.

I -t wasn• t u,ntil the appearance of Revelation and Reason
(1941) that the Christian philosop~er reached the real
age of discretion. in Brunner•s development of him.

In

this work the Christian philosopher's role is made obligatory and inescapable.
27. Emil Brunner,
a~.~-.
p.· ass.

~

At the same time bis role is
in, Revolt. p. 61

made less perilous by a detailed presentation of the •1aw
of the closeness of relation• ~or solving the difficult
boundary problem between the Christian philosopher's two
i

realms:

•
revelation
and reason.

Having now received a basic picture of the growth of
Brunner's 'iaw of the closeness of relation,• let us return
to the beginnings of the law as found in his book on ethics
and the orders, The Divine Imperative.

Although Brunner

hadn't fully developed the law then and hadn't even given
it its present day appellation, yet his application of it
to the orders is so skillful, revealin~ and meaningful that
we dare not overlook it.

First, we shall see how the law

comes to be . applied in the Christian's relation to the State;
and secondly, how it must be applied in the area of culture.
The attitude of th~ Christian to the Btate. 29 must
always be Januslike for the . simple reason that the Christian belongs both to the State and to the Kingdom of God.
"The St~te in its reality has always been and will always be
basically organized selfishness.

It is furthermore absolute-

ly supreme in its own sphere, but the alluring temptation is
ever present t o make itself absolute and sovereign in the
ultimate, religious sense of the word.

When it does that,

then the Christian must oppose it in obedience to the Biblical injunction:

• we must obey God rather than man.• 30 Thus

29. Of. Emil Brunner,
30. Acts 5:39.

.tu. Divine

Imperative. pp. 4~82.
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already the relative character of the State is perceived.
Even though the Christian cannot say •yea• to the sinful,
selfish and secular methods which •this greedy and daerraonic
monster• 31 has always employed and will always employ .for
increasing its power, yet •it is equally impossible for the
Christian to say 'Ro' to the State.•32 Why? because the
State is first a gift of God;, secondly,. a necessary protection against the unrighteousness of both unbelievers and believers; and thirdly, an essential part of our calling in
rendering service to our fellow man.
As much as the Christian would sometimes desire it,
he cannot expect the State to be governed in accordance
with the law of love.

That would do away with the funda-

mental meaning of the State, for the meaning of the State is
power.

Love and justice can at best be only regulative prin-

ciples, not constitutive principles, for the reason that no
State has ever sprung from the principles of justice or love.
•The State is primarily not a moral institution but an irrational product of history; the Christian State never has
existed and never will.

Where the State is concerned ethics

always lag behind.n33 At the same time, though not primarily,
the State must incorporate the just for its own health's sake
and for the moral energy of its people.
31. Emil Brunner, .sm,• .£li., p. 461.
32. Ibid.

33. Ibid. , 463

"A brutal will to

,.

power la bad stateamanahip.• 34 Ohriatianity makes its debut at this point a.a an influence in regulative justice.
It is the Christian's duty then to oppose equally both
errors· in the sphere of the State:

First, the •quietiatic

conservatism• which ·emphasizes the autonomy of the State to
such an extent that it denies that Christian influence has
any v'1.ue in it.

Second, the •sentimental radicalism• (Tol-

stoy) which desires to overcome the State completely by
faith or reject the State altogether.

To what extent should

the Christian bring his influence to bear avoiding both of
these extremes?
centre."

That depends on the law of the •personal

•Here, too, the law will hold good, that the fur-

ther the particular sphere is from the. personal centre the
less can be the influence of this regulative principle.• 35
The Christian's influence will reach zero in the purely formal juridicial questions; -the less difference is there between 'Christian• and •non-Christian• ••• • • 36

Also, for the

same reason, as Brunner clearly states in Justice !:.!!Si the
Social Order, 37 in the matter of justice in the social and
economic order of the State, Christian thinkers have found
it to their great advantage to sit obediently at the feet of
philosophers and pagan jurists.
herent in all men.

Justice is a quality in-

It is a characteristic instilled by an

34. Ibid., 464.
35. Ibid., p. 490.

36. Emil Brunner, Revelation gReaeon, p. 384.
37. Emil Brunner, Justice !:!!S,. the Social Order, p. 10,
90f.
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order of God's Cr~ation, the State.

Hence, Plato, Aristotle,

and the Roman 3urists can and do have much of validity to
say here.

The Christian's influence is at a necessary mini-

mum in these matters of the specialist and the expert.
But the Christian has plenty to say when the State
approaches too closely or transgresses the sacred boundaries
of the •personal centre,• when it tries to make itself sovereign in matters religious, or wh~n it attempts to interfere
with the Christian's service toward his fellow man.

Having

discussed the duties of the Christian toward his fellow, and
how the State is tempted to and often does interfere with
these duties, Brunner declares forcefully: • ••• we are called and who else is called if not Christians? - to raise our protest against every form of absolutism and omnipotence.• 38
Thus the Christian is obligated to play the dual role of citizen and Christian.

The "law of the closeness of relation•

or the "personal centre• is to tell him which he is to assume
at any given moment, and is to define the limits of his participation.
This law still better adapts itself to the Ohristian's
&ctivity in culture.39 By culture Brunner means that intellectual activity which is not a means to an end (as civilization), but a relative end in itself as science, art and
education.

In commencing it is all-important to note that

38. bil Brunner, The Divine Impgrative, p. 463.
39. lbid. 1 pp. 483-516.
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culture is not the result of any Ohristia.n faitll Qr morality,
but is the result of the "spiritual •natural impulse•. 11 40
It is a part of man's very nature bestowed upon him in the
Creation to create culture.

In giving man his reason, of

which •God is not the enemy,• 41 God gave man his formal
freedom.

1

Thia freedom lives in every re.tional act, whetber

in the creation of the artist, in the thought of the scientist, or in the activity of the educationalist.•43

It is

between this formal freedom which man still retains and the
material freedom which man lost in the Fall that we must always distinguish, otherwise· the relation between revelation
and

reason, between faith and culture becomes hopelessl~

confused.

The formal freedom gives reason and culture an

undisputed autonomy.

Science, a.rt and education all must

have their own immanent la.we.

Even the theologian and every

Christian who prays follows the independent laws of reason.
But that ls· only part of the picture.

Because of the same

reason that God has created the reason and given it an autonomy, He has also thereby limited it.
can be Absolute.

It can only live off the. Absolute.

incomplete in himself.

the material nature of freedom.
through his reason.
40. Ibid. 1 p. 384.

42. !bid., p. 485.

Man is

He is only complete when he comes in-

to the correct relation with God.

41. Ibid • .

Reason is and never

Only then do~s he reach
Now man can only believe

An animal cannot believe.

But when man
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refuses to believe, ~o respond through faith, then the relative end and relative autonomy of reason - and culture - has
become an absolute self-end,an ~utonomy.

Culture has set

up its own God, which is plainly 8.J1 idol •. Man indulg,1a in
the third classification of reason, philosophy, ~hich ta ezpressly forbidden.

Sad t9 say though. since time roemorial

culture has always worshipped. its

O\Tll

idol, reason.

This is where the fundamental opposition 'between faith
and culture takec place.

The Christian is aware of the per~

petual sinfulness of culture, but still he c.a nnot withdraw from
culture.

He must have something in which to express his

faith, and hence he must to

a certain extent cooperate with

the conditions of this sinful culture.
not produce a Christian culture,

any

"The Christian can-

more than he can bring

into existence a Christian State -or a Christian economic
system.• 43 Even the culture which he will help to create
will be sinful.

So while his faith cannot be a constitutive

element in the construction of culture, it can and must certainly be a powerful regulative and critical principle.

In

so far as it is a regulative principl,; it can produce a very

restricted "Christian• art, science and education.
0

Again,

tbe law will hold good, that the further the particular

· sphere is from the personal centre the less can be the influence of this regulative principle. 1144
43. Ibid., p. 489.
44. Ibid., p. 490.
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I11

concrete application this means -t ha.t in the cultural

sphere of science it is foolish to epeak of a Christian mathematics or a Ohristirm physics.
psychology

and

However, when in sociology,

particularly anthropology, scienc~ begins to

investigate personality, which constitutes par-t of the "personal centre," then the adjective •Christian• will m~ke a
great and meaningful impression.

.

Yet here tod the autono-

mous elemeqt is always at the same time present.

This ab-

stract scientific law gs.ins ground as it moves from the personal center, but it consistently loses ground as it approaches
that center where the real human being is being investigated.
Here at the persona.l center "Faith gains not merely a regu-

lative but a constitutive signiftcance.• 45

In art and educa-

tion f aith and revelation plays a mor~ regulative and constitutive role because both of theee are more closely related
to the personal center.

'Art is always the child of the long-

ing for something else. n46 Education can never be separat·e d
frorn the whole view of man and his responsibility.

Even so,

both of theoe have their autonomous, abstract rules too,
which are not a part offaith.

The Ohrist1an philosopher must

always recognize this rightful realm of reason in art and
education though he will be guided more by faith and revela-

-

tion 1n their development.
Having now defined, applied and established his •1aw of
the oloaenes& of relation,• Brunner draws two conclu,aions
45. Ibid.·, p. 496.

48.

Ibid., p. 499.
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town.rd achieving a solution of the prob;lem of nchr1st1a.n
philosophy. 0

The first is that the Christian fa.1th is some-

thing entirely different from philosophy.
arises from the 1 peraonal encounter• 47 of

Christian faith

God

and l!!!!l•

Philosophy originates through systematic thinking controlled
only by man.

The second conclusion is that philosophy should

not be the pr1m£lry interest of the believer.

"For his pri-

mary interest is, and ought to be, •to seek tlie Kingdom of
God and His righteouaness•.• 48 But this by no means requires

that

&

Christian cannot have any interest in philosophy or

may not use or study it.

"All things a.re yours. 049

"If a

Christian may study music - which until now has never been
disputed - then why should he not study philosophy?•50
But while Christian faith is something primarily different from philosophy, yet the Christian philosopher - and
this is important - docs not differ essentially from the
Christian theologian.
ner,

0

Thi~ is no because, according to Brun-

The break (bet ween revelation &nd reason) does not

occur between theology and philosophy, but between theology
and faith.• 51 So the difference between the Christian philosopher and the Christian theologian is one only of subjeot,
not of method.

•The difference between Christian philosophy

and Christian ~heology is therefore not one of principle,
47. On •personal encounter• -21· last chapter of this paper,
Ohapter IV.
·
48. Emil Br1.p1ner, Revelation and Reason, p. 384.
49. I Corinthians S:aa.
50-. Emil Brunner.1. !99.. R.!t•
51. Ibid •., p., 38~.
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but it is a fluid transition.• 58 Every systematic theologian
is already
philosopher
in the ,same body. Be
.
. and theologian
.
1a a theologian in so far aa he is concerned ~1th setting
forth the problems of the Holy Scriptures themselves, but he
is a philosopher in so far as he deals with the problems that

For example,

are in the background of Scriptural revelation.

a man like Karl Barth who in his Dogmatics refiects on time
11
distinguishes between i10od'
nthe
. s ti1ne and
. our. time,
time of expectation," "the time of fulfillment" and "the

and

time for revelation• is already penetrating the domain of
philosophy. 53

This 1neans that theology is not

II

sacred

science, 11 though 1t is hallowed by the t'lord of God.

"The-

ology itself is eeculu like every _o ther academic subject.• 54
Because of the deadening influence of orthodox tradition,
Frotestant theology has assumed the erroneous,

0

prejudiced

vie1"1 thca.t revela tion is revealed theology, and th&t theology
itself is therefore a •revealed,' that is, a •sacred'
sci.ance. 11 55
lead to the

This has been disasterous in so far as it has
II sacred''

isolation of theology.

•T his is con-

trary to the spirit of the Reforms.tion theology, and '. it like-

wise coniliots with the

11

priesthood. of all believers."

'l'he

Christian philosopher, the Christian jurist; philologist
and natural scientist all should stand alongside of the
53. Ibid., p. 390.

53. Quoted in .1.12J.g_.
54. l1!Jal., p. ~
55·. Ibid.
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Christian theologian on equal footing.

The •1aw of the close-

ness of relation• will in turn reveal the limits to whioh

~ach might proceed.
Since tt is between faith and theology ~hat the break
already occurs, here the theologian as well as the Christian
philosophizing layman must be most careful.

••••

This trans-

ition is, so to speak, to· be acoo1a1plished only at the risk
oi' one's life. 058 FJhy? simply because fe.ith is sorileth1ng
entirely personal.
man.

lt is t1·uth as encounter between God and

On the other hand, theology and Christian philosophy

are doctrine or thought about t!3at personal encounter.
a.re &.lrea.dy "truth

&6

idea."

They

For a fact, that cannot be

_helped because we human beings are made to think in the form
of idea~; we cannot do otherwise.

But the enticing tempta-

tion 1s always before us to lose sight of the

11

raith truth,•

the •encounter t1·uth 0 and see only the "idea truth. a

'l'his

le the terrible calamity that Greek intellectualism has inflicted upon ecclesiastical thinking almost from the beginning.57

It has resulted in C&tholocism, dead orthodoxy,

Biblical popery and. other stifling approaches which llave
sucked the ve.ry 11i'e blood from the Church.

The Church's

teaching and preaching has become, in many places and respects, purely intellectu&.l and abstract.

"The Church

turned the revelation of the Son into the revelation of an
56.. Ibid. , P• 389.

57. For a more extensive tre~tment of this terrible
Greek calamity ,gt,. Chapter IV of this dissertation.
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eternal truth 'about the Son•.•58 . In order to avoid seeing
only ideas while he must still ever employ ideas, -t he Christian philosopher ohould consta,nly return ~o the startingpoin~, ~hich is his faith and which is· •truth as encounter•
and not •truth as idaa.•

The Professor of Zurich puts it

well in the words:
Christian action needs to return to the starting-point continually in order that it may not
beco:.:ae soz!leth1ng riiff erent, or cor.1ethi ng wrong.
For always the one thing that matters is this:
that ·ne l i ve by :fa ith, that God should be honoured; it consists in creating room for God •••• 59

The dangers that the Christian philosopher will encounter are indeed great, but still he must face them.

He

cannot withdraw from the world because he cannot cease to
think.

11

0hristian philosophy is therefore both possible

and necessary because as Christians we neither can nor
should cease to thint.• 60 Christian philosophy appears
impossible only from the point of view of rationalism, not
from the vantage point of reason.

Philosophy's legitimate.

purpose - which does not co~lict with God-given reason is to set in order the varieties of impressions gained by
experience, whether they be mental, moral, artistic or religious.61

The deduction of the ~hole world from a given

principle, which philosophy has followed since Ionic days,
is really a usurpation by the scoundrel, rationalism. Sheer
58. Emil Br~nner, Revela tion and Reason. p. 149.

59. Erail Brunner, la!,

Mediator,

p. 816.

60. Emil Brunner, Revel~tion ~ Rea son, p. 392.
61 • .Qt. Brunner•s second use of reason, sunra, ·p. 38t.

61

critical thinking has shown that method to be erroneous
time and a.ga in. 62 The Christian philosopher bas been the
most critical of all.

That is as it should be because he

is in constant communion with tha correct ground of experience by faith with tba living Cod.

His f4ith ha.a set him

free, ma.de him iraillWle to s.ny r&.tionalistic, dOE:.i1l8.tic 6-bsolu-tisrn, and lead his rea.aon back to its origin6.l purpose.

His

reason has at the same time been given previously unknown
pcwr.r and alertness.
It is true, of course, that no one becomes a
'mathematician or an artist or a thinker of genius
simply because he is a genuine believer. But when
he becomes a believer powers are released which
.he did not know he possessed before. If in Jesuft3
Obrist 'all the treasures of wisdom are hidden,•
the believer gains a perception which, without being an that account •genius,' pierces more deeply
into truth, and soars~ greater heights than all
wisdom and philosophy.
Just how powerful faith might be, Brunner shows by declaring later:

"I am not so sure that the Christian faith could

not throw light on certain problems of mathematics.• 65
Mathematics carries us back to the expert, and the expert in turn carries us back to the Christian layman who
might be engaged in this particular area of activity.

Again

and again Brunner stresses that precisely the most beautiful
thing about his Christian philosophy is that it gives the
63.
63.
64.
65.

Cf. Drunner•s third use of reason, supra, p. 39.t.
Y-colossians 2:3.
Emil Brunner, ~ in Revolt, p. 343.

!l!!!i• I P• 544.

ea

la:x;ma.n plenty of opportunity for thinking and acting - his
God-given right and privilege under the "priesthood of all
believers.N

For too long the Church of the Reformation has

been burdened and hindered by the idea that the intellectual
aspect of Christianity
. !l\!11 be theology. 11 66 It is this misunderstanding, this foul interpretation which has ~idened
the gulf between the pastor and the layman to such a degree
that the Church has suffered tremendously.

The

theologian

uas the only pezson who ~as permitted to think as a Christian.

or

But there soon arose many lay-questions in the realm

specialist and expert knowledge th... t be could not answer.-

There were no laymen - jurists, philologists, historians,
natural scientists, polictical scientists - who ~ere so sure
of their Christian position and truths that they dated to
be Christian jurists, historians and scientists,

This is

one of the outstanding reasons tzhy the Enlightenment, Idealism and Positivism could so easily conquer the universities

during tli.e 18th a.nd 19th centuries.

ii~or partly tlle same

rec;:.son the layman has become disillusioned ,,1th the Church.
"The contemporary Christian intends to aha.re responsibility,
intends to give his strength to the service of the Church,
and is disillusioned by the Church if it withholds from him
the right of service.
do

A

Ohuroh that gives him nothing to

cannot satisfy hira. 1167
66. Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. "394.
67. Eutil Brunner, l.WL Divine-Hwna.n Encounter, p. l94f.

The catastrophic events of the past few decades have
demoustra·ted to us once and for all tha t the Church must
emerge .from its "fatal theological. ·1aolation. 11 88

11

The

events of our o,m da.y lla.ve a t 1a.st sllO\tD us that all cu.l-

turo need.s a. Christian found.a.tion. 11 69

The business of' es-

tablis hing this toundation cannot be left to the t heologian
alone because the Bible sim~ly does not ansrer all questions.
-~~e need Christi&n specialists in all spheres
of life; hence we need a Christian philosophy,
which, from the standpoint of the Christian f a ith,
can penetrate into the region which the theologian does not enter, because he also is only a
specialist in a .particular sphere of knowledge,
naraely, in that of renect1on upon divine revelation. The co-ordination of the vario~a spheres
of life is the task, not of the theologian, but
of the philosopher. But if this co-ordination
1s to take placa from the standpoint of the Christian faith, 'hen we need precisely a Christian
philosophy. O·

The proble1n of Christian philosophy is so very urgent becauae there ia such a tremendous need !or the penetration

.

of all spheres of life by the Christian spi:rit.

This pene-

tration will only occur when we understand that theology
is not above Christian philosophy just as the pastor is not
above the layman.

Obrist is the head of both and

Tl1ey both stand undor Christ, the one in an
inner, the other in an outer, circle; the one
with t~e t ask of understanding the message of
Jesus Christ in its inmost depths of meaning;

68. Emil Brunner! Revelation a.nd Rea.son, p. 395.
89. Ibid. This v ew ot Srunner•a is the resu.lt of quite

an evolution since the days of· The Divine Imnera tive (1932)~
in which lle states definitely:. 1rft' is not the business of t.ne
believer as s~ch to crwa te culturo •• Thut is the task of man
apart rrom fa.1th •••• And agin: The Christ1an cannot produce a Christian culture •••• • p. 489.
70. Ibid.

and thus purifying the proclamation of the Gospel and ever anew basing it on the Word of revelation; the other with the task of making clear
the truth offaith in order to throw light on
the problems of Christian living in the world,
and to help them to. deal with these problems in
a creative way.71

0rit1c·1am
The teachings, postulates and positions of Emil Brunner
are difficult to criticize.

Thia is not because he furnishes

a perfect system that defies anything but constructive criti-

cism, far from it.
lectical method.

It is rather because of his elusive, diaAs Daniel D. Williams of the University

of Chicago analyzed the problem, •Brunner•s writing has a
deceptive smoothness and simplicity on the surface.

Under-

neath there is a dialectical restlessness and a continuous
subtle movement.• 72

It is emctly this •dialectical rest-

lessness" that makes the final ~inning down of any single
doctrine of Brunner•s tricky and perplexing.

His mass of

unresolved paradoxes, contradictions and seeming inconsistencies leave one hanging in a quandary as to his eza.ct position.

The reader is prone to take a Udialectica1• attitude

and approach as regards him.

He

would never like to state

such a definite •no• that he could not recover it with a
"yes.•

He would like to allow sufficient room to backtrack

with the qualitive condition: •to a certain extent Brunner
71. lllJ4., p. 396.
72. D. D. Williams, Jm.•

.£1:l. p. •241.
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says this, to a certain extent this is true concerning him,

that is false.•

In a word, one finds it an ~duous task to

come to a decisive conclusion without doing the Professor
of Zurich an injustice in some way or another.
One example to illustrate this difficulty of knowing
just what Brunner means is his position regarding the fall
and Cr~ation.

He declares:

•Heither this original reve-

lation nor original sin can be placed within the historical
category.• 73 Yet while the historical fact is gone, in the
very neY.t breath he states that the concept·s and the truths
of the concepts are still in v.i tal force.

He then conven-

iently relegates the Fall and Creation to the vague categorJ
of "supra-history, 0 which no one I have met thus far can
quite penetrate.

We a.re inclined to agree with J.P. Clel-

land who said in his review of Revelation and Reason:
These are all limiting concepts and at once we
feel ourselves drawn into the dizzy whirl of dialecticism with its yea-no, true-false, black-white,
1 tis- 1 taint, until we no longer know whether we
are coming o~ going. God is revealed, yet He is
hidden; the Scriptures are the Uord, yet th9l are
not the Word; man is saved, yet he is lost.
Another thing that makes Brunnerian principles difficult to investigate thoroughly is the conspicuous lack
of definitions of terms, particularly crucial terms like
reason and philosophy.

Daniel Williams speaks again:

73. Emil Brunner, Reveiation and Reason, p. 264.
74. John P. Clelland, Review of Brwmer•s Revelation
g Reason,• in l:.l!!, weytminater Theological Journal, Vol
Ro. l, (Dovember, 1947, p. 61.
'

x,

68

••••

he never defines these terms.

many

quasi-definitionai but he never says: 'Here is ezaotly

To be sure, he gives

the sense in which I mean to use these words• .• •75 Brunner•a
approach is mainly what is called the •typological.•

He

gives a host of illustrations, examples and contrasts and
let's it to the reader to be able to see the clear meaning
of a term sitting out by itself.

'l'his method becomes quite

confusing sometimes, and it puts Brunner in a position that
leaves him vulner~ble to-misunderstanding.
On the other hand, to say that Dr. Brunner is not one
of the greatest writers, thinkers and. theologians of our
an
day is to do him/injustice. His living, popular tomes are
loaded with penetrating, stimulating and inspiring thought.
Emil Brunner•a influence is already measured in deoadea
and ~111 continue to be so computed.

His prime purpose to

awaken a more living Christianity, to arouse a more influential Christianity in every sphere of human activity is
most laudable.

lels F. S. Ferr6 sums it all up well in his

I

resume of Revelation .!D!iReaaon:
To me he (Brunner) is one of the most all
around Christian writers of our time •••• lly
settled opinion is that though Brunner hardly
has all it takes to meet our modern problems,
yet he bas so much to say of critical importance
and wise insight, that for any alert thinker
to miss reading him is a distinct misfortuna.76
75. Daniel D. Williams, .sm,• .£U., p. 243
76. Nels r. s. Ferr~, •Book Review on Brunner•s Revelation
!:ml Reason,• in 'l'heologv Tod.av, Vol. IV, No. 1, (April, 1947),
p. 143.
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It is our conviction that there is muoh to be ·learned
from Dr. Brunner's inquiry into the age ol~ problem of the
relationship between reason and revelation

and hie

Christ-

ian philosophy that grows therofrom.
Even though the world is sinful, even though a perpetual Ar mageddon has arisen between reason and revelation
because of the sinfulness of the world, yet the Christian
cannot wi thdra\Y from the world.
own reason.

He cannot ,1.1thdraff from his

Positively, the more earnestly and diligently

the Christian plays his role in the world the ·more will this
evil world be held in check.
and

Certainly the spirit of Christ

the Hew Testament is in contradiction to any withdrawal.

from the world and any ascetic denial of the world in the
vein of St. An1fhony of Simon the Stylite.

St. Paul writes:

•1or ev.e ry creature (better. ·• creation 1 ) . of God is good, and.
nothing to be refused,• 77 "Unto the pure all things are
puren78 and •All. things are yours, 079 Such passages preclude

any

ascetic denial.

Rather they give the Ohris-t ie.n

a positive, free and activistid position in society'.

Thia

position in society im~oses on the Christian the use of· his
God-given reason.

•Replenish the eµth an~ subdue it,• cer-

tainly presupposes the. use of the mind and reason.

~ithout

it man could subdue nothing and would be on the same plane
with the animals.
77. J iimothy' 4:4.
78. Titus 1:1.5.
79. I Oorintniana 3:~l.
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It is almost too trite to repeat - but possibly because
of its triteness it is often overlooked - that the explanation to the First Article; recorded three times in our Confessions, recognizes reason as God-given.

..

•I believe •••

that he has given me my body ,and soul •· my reason, and all
my senses •••• • 80 Luther, the author of these words, regarded reason to be the gi(t of God even though he allowed
no place for reason in matters spiritual.

He declares:

"Therefore the attempt to establish or defend divine order
with human reason, unless that reason has previously been
established and enlightened by faith, is just as futile as
if I would throw light upon the sun with a 11ghtless lantern,
or rest a rock on a reed.• 81 But the mat t er was wholly different after reason has b·e en enlightened by faith.

Luthezi•·s

reply to Dr. Henning on this matter is •well known: • ••• but
in the hands of those who believe, 'tis an excellent instrument.

All faculties and gifts are pernicious, exercised by

the impious; but most salutary when possessed by godly persons.N82 Perhaps Luther paid his greatest compliment to
reason when in the critical hour of Christendom he declared:
uun1ess I am proved to be wrong (convictus fuero) by the
witness of Scripture or by evident reasons (ratione evidente),
••• I neither can nor will make any retraction •••• •B3
80. Concordia RiiglHf· pp. 532,21 681,3; 871,38.

Bl. Luther Ho man

tion Vol.

1,

p. 346.

ea. The Ta~le Talk of Mart!n Luther, trans. William

Hazli tt:--E'sq. , p.4t:" 83. Luthert W. A. VII, p. 838, ~oted in Emil Brunner,
Revelation J!!!Sl.Reason, p. 380.

89

In accord with this utterance Luther was not of the opinion
that men might not knon or study philosophy.

•I don't say

that men may not teach and learn philosophy; I approve thereof, so t~at 1t be w:ithin reason and moderati.o n.• 84 Though
Luther hated scholastic Aristotelian metaphysics with an
intense hatred yet he stated that he would like to see the
Stagirite 1 s books on Logic, Rhetoric and Politics retained
for use in teaching and preaohing. 85 This statement i~
closely akin to arunner•a previously cited position86 that
in some matters, politics fo~ example, the Christian thinker
1

might do well to sit at the feet of Aristotle and the other
philosophers.
The Lutheran or~hodox dogmaticians have never contested
the ministerial use of reason (usus rationis ministerialis,
organicus) as the means by which man perceives and thinks.
"Reason in this sense has a legitimate and necessary place
in theology, since the Holy Spirit implants and preserves .
saving faith through the Word of God which is received into
the human mind. 187 To this ministerial use of reason is
added the study of languages and particularly the use of
grammar and logic •because the Holy Spirit was pleased to
accommodate uimself to the laws of human thought and
speech. 188

I!1Js. .2f. Martin Luther, p. 37.
Luther, Holman Edition, Vol. II, p. 147.
.Q!. aunra, p. 17.•
John T. ~ueller, Christian Domnatics, p. 92.
Ibid. ·

84. ll!!, Table

85.
86 •
87.
88.
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The Lutheran theologians then raised the question: •Ia
reason and philosophy altogether opposed to faith and theology?•

Their answer was no.

them mereiy above

Faith and theology are for

legitimate reason. But they are contrary

to the arbitrary, corrupt

and

perverted reason.

~uenstedt:

"Philosophy and the principles of Reason are not contrary
to Theology, nor the latter to the former.•8 9 And Gerhard:
"In themselves considered, there is no contrariety, no contradiction between Philosophy and Theology~ because whatever things concerning the deepest mystery of~a ith Theology
propounds from revelation, these a wiser and sincere Philosophy knows are not to be discussed and estimated according
to the principles of reason, lest there be a confusion of
wh~t pertains to entirely different departmenta.•90 Only
when reason leaves its banks and overflows into the private
field of revelation must it be condemned, as ~uenstedt states
again:

uTheology does not condemn the use of Reason, but

its abuse and its affectation of directorship, or its magisterial use, a.a normative and decisive in divine thiims.•91
~n complete accordance therewith our Lutheran dogrnaticians
never depreciated the proper use of philosophy, but condoned
it as having value even for the theologi&n, though in a very
restricted sense.

Its value vas felt when the theologian

89. Heinrich Schmid. la!, Doctrinal Theology: .2!. the !!!mgel igal Lutheran Church, trans. Hay and Jacobs, p. 32.
90. ~ - , p. 33.

91. Ibid., p. 35.
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ap·p roached the so-called •mixed• articles of Holy SQripture,
truths which could be known also somewhat by reason.

In re-

gard to them Quenstedt says: •In the mixed articles we grant
that philosophical pr1nci,p les ma.y be employed; not, indeed,
for the purpose of decision or demonstration, but merely
for illustration, or as a sort of a secondary proof of that
which has already been decided by the Scriptures.n92 Gerhard
adds thereto: "In this latter manner the Theologian becomes
indebted, for some things·, to the philosopher • • • • •93 Thus
we see here also that the theologian cannot es cape dealing
with the problem of philosophy and theology, or reason

and.

revelation no matter how fnndamen~al and devoted a Bible
student he might be.

It is a question he is forced to face

even though manyc:a.lamitous• perversions have resulted in these
two area~ when subtle philosophy broke from its reins and
overran theology.

Thus far we are, therefore, in almost per-

fect harmony with the principles as set forth by Dr. Brunner.
ahen our theologians distinguished "mixed" articles
from "pure 0 articles, they were in effect saying that there
are some articles which are not a.a closely related to the
absolute center of God and ntan and revela tion. a s others.
In the "pure" articles man could only know through revelation and reason could never be valid.

Yet in the umixed•

articles reason could be valid too in a restr~cted sense
92 • .!!!!!!-, p. 37f.
93. Ibid. , p. 37.
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because man could know in part by his God-given reason~ .Of
course, they were most careful to repeat that just because
the "mixed" articles had some validity before t he bu of
reason was not the cause for the Ohristian•s believing them.
His cause for believing them was simply Scriptural revelation.

Still and all, certainly the doctrine of salvation

by faith in the atoning Jesus Christ is more closely related to the center - it is the center of Scriptural teaching regarding a man's salvation - than the doctrine of the
natural knowledge of God, which any Aristotelian, Hindu or
Hottentot can know, though not perfectly, through his natural reason.

There is a sort of a "law of the closeness of

relation" even in' theology.

Whether or not there ia much

value in employing such terminology in this area is another
question.
But the •1aw of the closeness of relation" does have
value when the Christian layman finds himself face to face
with problems and questions concerning which there is no
answer in Scripture.

Our sanctified common sense already

tells us that in such matters as pure ma.thematics, logic,
architectural drawing and some related subjects the Bible
has little to say.

In these fields the Christian will have

more •freedom" than in the pursuit of activities like psychology, sociology, anthropology or their kin.

Furthermore,

in the former his thinking pure and simple will differ
little or none from the non-Christian's thinking, while in

73

the latter his thinking will necessarily differ vastly from
the unbeliever's.

Psychology, sociology and anthropology

nearly always suggest definite ethical implications and injunctions.

The true Christian can never escape facing e.

Scriptural judgment on any system or suggestion or naturalistic ethics.

The u1aw of the closeness of relationn ie val-

uable in so far as it gives the Christian a helpful tool
with which he can work in measuring wherein and how far he
must differ from his unbelieving associates in study and
research.

The result will be, let us say, no 8 0hriatian•

formal ma.thematics, but will certainly be a. Christian study
of man or anthropology.

Whether or not the Christian anthro-

pologist noi:1 wishes to call himself a "Christian philosopher•
rests entirely with him.

!21_ p;uetibue non

.ill dlsnutanduml

~vith Brunner the designation 11 0hristie.n philosopher" ls a
very fluid, non-frightening and arbitrary term.

Brunner be-

gins to apply it to the Christian as soon as the Christian
embarks upon thought or action outside of the strictly formal sphere of logical thougllt perception or commo.n sense.
In other \vords, for him the Christian jurist who thinks
about pol itical or social justice is already a Christian
philosopher.
e heartily agree with Dr. Brunner that the Christian
layman ought to take a most active part in whatever secular
calling he happens to o~oose.

He ought to make his Christ-

ianity kno'YD and felt in his particular calling too.

He

ought surely to differ from his non-Christian associate in
so far as a difference is possible and necessary.

That is

to say, a difference is hardly possible in purel7 formal
geometry, but it is certainly necessary in anthropology.
To the extent that the Christian working in anthropology
must differ from his non-Christian partner, he must develop
his own system of anthropology which does not conflict with
Scriptural revelation in any case or point.

Thia is not

to say that everything in his system will be directly defined by Scripture.

Scripture does not and was not made

to ansver every question abo~t the study of man and his movements.
This "law of the closeness of relation" can, however,
easily mislead.

It can induce the. Christian who hap,p e~ to

be a mathematician into believing that since he is moving about on the outer periphery, he need not concern himself
with the center at all.

While his disconcern is possible

with regard to the purelv

formal

aspect of his interest, it

is definitely not possible in the material aspect.

The ma-

terial aspect rises into prominence when the mathematician
views the whole mysterious background of his. subject or
takes into consideration motives and desires.

The familiar

story about Albert Einstein well illustrates the "mysterious background• of even a formal subject as mathematics.
After Einstein has filled his fourth or fifth blackboard
with intricate formulae and elaborate equations in search
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for some unknown, he begins to mutter:
uncannyJN

nue•s UDC&DDJ' J He's

Brunner likewise acknowledges:

"Even the simplest

atom of hydrogen has its •metaphysical background,' as indeed, all and each have ita definite place in the whole plan
of the Creator and Redeemer.• 94 And from the point of view
of motives the Christian differs most widely from his nonChristian associate.

The Christian promotes the glory of

God and the welfare of his fellow

man.

The non-Christian

may have the service of his fellow brother in mind, but he

altogether lacks that motivating fear and love of God. The
crucial question arises:

Oan motives ever be separated

from thinking or acting?

We doubt if any separation ezists

beyond. the 01ind.

We believe that in actual practice mot-i ves

cannot be separated from actions.

~"ven the Christian judge

will be impelled by a different rnotive than the non-Christian.

~e firmly believe furthermore that in nis enthusiasm

over his discovery Brunner sometimes loses sight of this
significant factor of motives.

Still the distinction be-

tween the formal and the material, and the a1aw of the closeness of relationN that grows out of this distinction, is
both valid and necessary.

It is ·as valid as our distinction

between justification and sanctification.

It is as necessary

as the Christian's duty to engage in secular pursuits.
.there were no formal side to mathematics, jurisprudence,
94. Emil Brunner, Revelation .!!!S1 Reason, p. 382.

If

?8

business, mechanics and similar areas of human interest then
every Christian \VOUld have to become a her1ni t.

He could not

be a "salt 11 or a 11 light.•
Where we do differ wholly from and draw a eharp lino
of contention with Brunner though, is where he states:

The break (between revelation and reason) does
not occur bet\veen theolo·gy and philosophy, but between theology and faith. That transposition of
the encounter of faith - of that conversation between God who addresses man and the ma.n who responds - is accomplished already in the doctrine
of the Church by the transition from the sphere
of the personal into that of the idea. 'Thinking it over' is tlle beginning of the prQcess
that wi~5 be carried farther by a Christian philosophy.
On the immediate surface this does not appear so bad, because, true! the theologian is required to "think" even as
any jurist or artist-

Furthermore, we agree that theology

is not the same as faith because a person may be a master
theologian and atill r.1.ot have f'a.ith.

But because this seem-

ing inconsista.ncy is possible does not mean that now the
break between revelation and reason must come somewhere lz!!~

theology and philosophy.

The Dible tells us time and

time again that man can and does resist the workings of the
Holy Spir 1 t through the riord.
not do otherwise.

Indeed, of himself man can-

i·:hy tlien some are converted and others

are not, is an enigmatic question that the Bible leaves unanswered, and so do we.
95. ,ills., p. 389.

Brunner tries vainly to answer this
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UJJ,8.Dswer~blo question by placing the break be.tween revelation and reason al~eady between faith and theol~gy: between
•the personal encounter .of God and man° and •the thinking

over" of thie encounter by ma.n..

Not only does he fail to

arrive at a satisfactory solution to the problem, but at
the same time he commits the gross error of stating: ''the
break does not occ~ between theology and philoaophy. 11 96
Between theology and philosophy is precisely llhere the break
occurs! Theology is on all a.ides closely bounded; limited
and

guarded by the Holy Scriptures.

As soon as theology

goes beyond Scripture in substance or in thought it ceases

to be Christian and Bibliqal theology, for, as ~enstedt
declares:

"The sole, _proper, adequate, and ordina.ry aource

of Theology and of the Christian Religion is the divine revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures; or, what is the
sa.~e thing, that the canonical Scriptures alone are the ab-

solute source of Theology, so that out ,2t !wm!, a.lone are the
articles of faith to be deduced an4 drawn.• 97 For the true,
orthodox Christien theologian the break will ever come bet:-1een theology o.nd philosophy becaune Ei.s long as the trw,
Christian theologian ts working in the field of theology he
must abandon all philosophizing and rationalizing.

He must

not substitute his h~an rr.a.chine.tions for or essentially

weave them into the pattern of revelation.
Biblicum, non .m _ theologicum,

~

llQ!! eat

One more pertinent statement

98. liiUenstedt,
lbJJl.
97.
quoted in H. Schmidt, .sm,. ill-, p. 2 7f•
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by Quenstedt:

•Divine revelation is tb.e first and the le.at

source of sacred Theology, beyond ~hich the theological discussion among Ohriotians dare not proceed. ■ 98
For Brunner the break between revelation and reason can
and already doee occur ~etween faith and theology.99

It

occurs there because he plainly violates "revelation as the
first and last source of sacred TheoloGY, beyond which theological discussion among Ohristians dare not proceed."

To

the 1ord of Revelation contained in Holy Scriptures he adds
reason.
Reason tells him first of all, in contradiction to clear
passages of Scripture, that he cannot identify the Word of

God with the entire Holy Scriptures of the Canon.
ner states:

Dr. Brun-

"The Scriptures are the Word of God, because,

and .!n. eo far.!!., they give us Christ."(Underlining my ownJlOO
Aleo, "••• Holy Scriptures; the latter has authority only.
in so far ae it is the Word of God, not in itself, and therefore never as an entity which is at the disposal of theology
98. Ibid., p.

as.

99. Our contention with Brunner ia muoh more than a petty

argument over semantics. It involves much more than whether
we 1aean the eame thing but disagree over the use of the word
•philosophy• in theology. As before stat,d, •thinking it
over," employing granunar and logic, for Brunner is already
philosophizing. Thus far the disagreement is one only of
words. But ~hen \"le note l a ter in our discussion that Brunner challenges basic Bl~lical doctrines on the shaky foundation of scientific hypotheses and metaphysical principles,
then we see how very much more is involved, a~d vhy for him
the break mµs t lls.ppe11 bett1een faith and theology. Theology
has already become phi~osophy, ancl •rationalistic• philosophy
too, not merely ugramma.tical• 01· "logioal 11 philosophy.
100. Emil Brunner, Revelation ys, Reason, p. 280.
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or ecclesiastical law.NlOl We now .u nclerstand why for Brunner the break has to occur between faith and theology. The-

ology for him must appeal to something in addition to the
Bible, namely, reason.

'l'he Bible has authority only .!!l..&2.

i:Ell it is the Word of 'God.

~uoh of the Bible isn't the

Word of God, but •ts the human, and therefore· not the infallible, witness to the divine revel&tion. 11102 In theologizing, consequently, one cannot employ it as an absolute law
but must also accept with it the findings of higher criticism end of science, particularly in the areas of space,
ti1ae, and evolution.

Thus, • ••• historical cri ttcism •••

ha s pointed out vurtous contradictions in the book of Acta,
and has discovered various inconsistencies in the assignment of certain definite ~ritings to well-known Apostles as
their authors. 1110 3 Darwinianis·m, iihioh demonstrates the old
orthodox view of the Creation, the historical Paradise and
the F&ll to be untenable, • ••• has become scientif-ic truth,
with which all honest theology has to come to terms •••• n104
Furthermore, •the doctrinal differences of the Old Testament
are great; the contradictions seem to mock all efforts to

gain a unified view.

Indeed, anyone who tried to make

&

scientific unity of view out of all these different and
101. Emil Brunner, ~!!!.Revolt p. 295.
102. Emil Brunner, Revelation and ReaEop, p. 376.
103. Ibid., p. 285.
104. Ib1~. 1 p. 279.

contrnd1ctory elen1ents would only knock his head against a
·,vall. nl05 .
For Brunner the break must take place between f&ith
and theolo~ bece.uue the theologian to be fit must be aao:re
than an intelligent, believing Ohristian.

He must be anthro-

pologist, scientist, sociologist, archeologist, jurist ~nd

philosopher combined.

The expert in all these fielc.eis

competent to eit in
judgment on Biblioel revelation in de,
ciding what 1s the actual Word of God.

The findinga"in these

fielde are furthermore to be woven into any theological sys-

tem.
The dismal truth is that the findings in these fields
a1·e too oft an the produc ta of mortal reason.

They are often

f a l l ible humr.n hypotheoes and speculations as history has
repea tedly shown.
ily mistaken.

1'hese "scientific'' findings ca.n be read-

But even this fact does not perturb Brunner

too greatly beoauae for llim theology rnust e.l\18.ys remain pliable anrl subject to change.

or literalistic.
old orthodoxy.

It must never become dogrna.tio

Indeed, th\s \Vc:s the basic fa.ult of the

And it failed so miserably because it could

not adjust itself to the orltical, rationalistic and scientific findings of the Imlightenment.
n •••

Dr. Brunner declares:

in Protestantism everything was staked on the Bible,

and ~ithin Orthodoxy upon the legal authority ~f the actual
letter of Scripture.

Hence when this foundation was destroyed,

105. Ibid., p. 29lt.
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the whole building began to totter. ■108

•'l'his was caused

by the EnlighteDDJent.•107

According to Brunner's rule no eystem of dogma.tics oan
be a. final statement of faith a.nd religioue truth.

Its pre-

viously stated, it is the task of the the~lo~ian to make
dogmatics "a mediator ln between worldly scienQe and supraworldly testimony of falth. 11108 The carrying throu~h of
this principle out to its logical; consistent conolusions
and i mplica tione will by sheer neceeEity demand a break between faith and theology.

The boundaries of theology have

already been v,iped out by the encroachment of human reason.
Theolog11 has bec01ne philosophy.
11

Brunner therefore concludes:

Tlle difference bet\veen Christian philosophy and Christian

theolog,1 is therefore not one of principle, but is

e1o

fluid

transition.• 109
Our second main objection to the theology of h}nil Brunner invQlves his dialectical approach.

In investigating

Drunner•s dialectical epproaoh one discovers further evidence as to uhy it is essential for him to declare the break
be t,,,e.en fa.i th and theology.

The dialectical a1,proe.oh to

theolOg'/ introduces a foreign element into theology, na..~ely,
philosophy.

For Brunner this approach is inescapable tor

apprehending tbe truths of revelation and must always be
106. Emil Brunner, The Mediator, p. 105.
107. ro1d.., p 34.
108. Emil Brunner, Ra Ohr1stliohe Lehre !2n Gott, p. 11,
quoted in Dale lioody, .sm_• .£11., p. 328.
109. Emil Brunner, Revelation ms.Reason, p. 390.

employed.

•It ia only ~Y means of the contradiction that

we can apprehend the contradictory ~ruth that the eternal
God enters time •••• ■llO We would never deny that the dialectic does have its value in logic and thinking, even as
the Hegelian synthesis has its value, but we strongly protest against its employment in theology as a kind of a support and buttress.

The dialeoticians, including Brunner,

have made the dialectic a pivotal point in their whole theology, and Scriptural authority has suffered greatly because
of it.

As Dr. 'l'h. Engelder puts it:

•They do say that their

sole authority is the Word of God; but if we ask them why
they are then filling their books with the metaphysical discussions of the law of the dialectic, they will have to
answer that they do it for the purpose of establishing or
at least strenghtening their theology. ■lll
Luther said,and every Christian will agree with him,
~hat Scriptural t~uth contains~ unres~lved paradoxes.
One of the foremost is the paradox of the Law and the Gospel, the apprehension of which, as Luther plainly sa'id, requires a very skilled •dialeotician.•

But that does not

mean that our whole approach to the Bible must be dialectical.

It is ~ot by the sheer force .2t!hl. dialeotio that we

believe Scriptural doctrine.
dialectician proposes.

But this is precisely what the

Where there is sin, there must be

110. Emil Brunner, la@. Word .!J!!i the World, p.
in Theodore Engelder, .22,• .£U., p. aso.
111. Th. Engelder, .sm,• .21t,., P.• 250.

a, quoted

graoe.

Ylhere · there is Qod as veiled, there must be God as

revealed.
tion.

And where there is death, there must be resurrec-

These truths hold good not so much 'because clear pas-

sages of Scripture teaoh them,. but because the law of the
dialectic demands them.
other.

There cannot be one without the

There can never be so decisive a •no• that it does

not harbor the possibility of a •yes.•
ly term p~iloaophical.

Thia approach we plain-

The Bible indeed says that where sin

abounded grace did much more abound.

But this truth exists

not because any law of the dialectic demands it, but purely
because God has so revealed it.

Sin in itself does not pre-

suppose grace.
It is possible to cite

many

examples of how Brunner em-

ploys the dialectic to prove or at least bolster up Scriptural truths.

Here we have room for only one.

From this conception (ainner)F however, there
springs a remarkable dialectic, very characteristic of the Bible. This negation; sin, presupposes
a positive element, of which it is the negation.
••• Sin always has a history behind it. It means
turning away; it is a break with the originally
positive element. Turning away from God presupposes an original positive relation with God, and
thus an original revelation•••• Thus the revelation that is given to the sinner is not the first
one; it presupposes a previous revelation apart
from which man could not be a sinner.112
~e abhor ~11 this precarious indulgence in the confusing
logic of the dialectic to prove that man was once at one
with God, then fell and is now a sinner.

How muoh more

112. Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 25f.

I

84

authoritative and leas bewildering to use the simple SorlPtural stor~ of the Creation, the Fall and the Ourse of man
as told in Genesis I and II.•
Just how preoar·i ous Brunner• a introduction of the dialectic and other philosophical arguments into his theological
system is, ~a demonstrated by the straightlaced philosopher,
J.

s.

Bizler:
One feels like turning Brunner's own method baok
against him. To put the matter in the sharply alternative way of which he is so fond - either Christ's
coming was revelation, meaning by that something
which transcends the ordinary laws of thought, or
it was not. If it was revelation we cannot discuss
it, or at least we cannot so confidently say what
must and what must not have happened, for we have
only our own ordinary thought forms to use. If it
was not revelation it cannot be so decisively separate from ethics and reason. But Brunner himself
asserts that it was revelation and still goes on
trying to convincf his readers 12.x. logic ,!ml argu,msm1. In ap1 te o his own statement one is thus ·
forced to believe that the transcendence of God and
of his r~velation is coupled with at least a sutficient degree of immanent qualities 1D enable 11 ,12.
l1!. discussed •••• •(Underlining my own)113
In short, Brunner and the rest of the dialecticians are

playing with fire in employing philosophic.a l principles and
arguments.

They are making themselves vulnerable to abstract,

rationalistic philosophy which Brunner tries hard to avoid.
(Brunner•s third use of reason) because they are flirting
with its very daughters.
113. J. s. Bizler, •Brunner and the Theology of Crisis,•
in The Journal ,g!Religion, Vol. IX, Ho. 3, (July, 1939)
p. 455f.
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III.

Brunner•a Principle of •truth as Encounter•

Thus far we have produced two major objections to Emil
Brunner 1 s view of the relation between revelation and reason
and his idea of Christi~ philosophy.

Both of these objec-

tions sprang primarily from our ma.in line of contention uith
Brunner that the breaking. point between revelation and reason occurs already between f~ith and theology.

We saw, in

the first place. that for him the break must occur there because ha allows reason to sit in judgment over revelation in
deciding what is the Word of God.

In the second place, ~e

discussed his typical dialectic approach to\1'8.rd theology which
again necessitates the break between faith and theology because the dialectic approach is basically a philosophical
one.

Brunner has already introduced illioit·reason and phil-

osophy into the private chamber of theology.
his theology has become in

many

As a result,

respects something decided-

ly different from the simple Christian faith as set forth
by divine revelation in the Holy Oanon.
Qur third principal objection to Brunner•s idea of
Christian philosophy is the most vit.a l of all.

It enters

where Brunner begins discussing faith as •personal encounter
between

God

and man," where he asserts Christian truth to

as

be "truth as encounter~•

Re object strongly at this point

because Brunner here proposes theses that concern the very
nature of faith and :revelat•ion,.

These are concepts which

even the Bible does not define.

No

one knows, because the

lloly Scriptures do not tell us, what faith is in its very
essence and how God mysteriously reveals Himself to an individual and converts him through the 'lord.

Yet Brunner is

bold enough to try to unravel this mystery with his on reason.

In doi~so he grossly violates his o.m laws of "the

closeness of relation" ·and "the personal centre,• la.us on
which his whole idea of Christian philosophy hinges.

Says

Daniel D. Williams, and we agree entirely with him: "Brunner introduces a philosophical idea into his theology at
the very point where he says it does not belong, namely,
in the description of the encounter betNeen God and man.•l
Dr. Brunner•s principal exposition of the •personal
encounter" and •truth as encounter" theme is found in his
book ls!.Divine-Human Encounter.a In this work he molds
this theme in bright, bold relief against the dark, drab
background that he has painted of the Greek conception of
.

.

truth apprehended through the Object-Subject antithesis.
He declares:
The use of ~ Ob:leot-Sub:legt antithfte1 a 1A. un:derRanalii'g'the truth 0:., faith . . . is a disaste:rous misunderstanding which affects the entire content
1. Daniel D. Williams, .sm,:.9.11., p. 251.
The German title is much morre revealing. It is· precisely \'lahrheit !:l!, Begegpung, Truth .!I. Encounter.

a.
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of Christian doctrine and also operates fatally
in the practice of the Church, moat severely
impairing the procl&mation of the l ord and faith
among the fellowship. The Biblical understanding
.2'. truth c&nnot 9.1. grasped through~ Ob:leotSubject antithesis: .2!!. 1b§. contrary 11 l!, falsified through .!t,.3
Just what is this disastrous Object-Subject antithesis?
The Professor of Zurich employs the historical method in defining these two concepts, Object and Subject.

These con-

cepts assumed their basic form in the early Greek minds. The
Sophists and Socrates a.re examples of this type of mind which
was concerned solely with the philosophical problem of truth
and knowledge as entities apart from being and thinking.

In

a few words, in their minds the Object as opposed to the
Subject emerged~

Greek philosophy soon cast its deadening

spell over Christian thought.

The erroneous idea then arose

••• that the divine revelation in the Bible had
to do with the communication of those doctrinal
truths which were inaocesaible by themselves to
human reason;and correspondingly that faith consisted in holding these supernaturally revealed
doctrines for truth. 4
The supposition of the Object-Subject antithesis has burdened
the Church's understanding of revealed truth and determined
,

its practice ever since.

The Church cannot seera to break

away from this witested, unrecognized and unconscious "application of the antithesis between Object and Subject, between
3. Emil Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, p. aof.
4.

llll!i· ,

p. 19.
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the objective truth of faith (Credo) and the subjective acceptance of faith (credo). 0 5
The over-emphasis on the Object almost immediately
leads to two ruinous errors in the Boman Catholic Church.

The first error of Objectivism began with the asking and
answering -of such questions: how long after reception does
the consecrated Host of Christ remain in the stomach of the
believer?

Before long this entirely personal event of the

Sacrament became an i!l'Personal, _physical-m~taphysical object, a sort of a material medicament which is at the disposal of the priest a.ny time he may choose.

The second

error of Catholic Objectiviam is of a more aubtile nature,
though its basic purposes and tendencies are the same. It
is concerned with the Word of God.

God gave His Word to

the Church to be proclaimed, but the power of that Uord
comes. only from Him t -h rough the work of the Holy Spirit.
The Catholic dogmaticians \ranted the Word as an object to
be at thsir own disposal.

The Ohurch des-ired •to be certain

of God in a more direct way than is guaranteed through the
promise as given to fai-t h in prayer. " 8 To that end the
Church arrogat~d the authority of the ~ord to itself and
ms.de it an object available in a mighty system of ecclesiastical assurances and canon law of, which the Pope ia

s.

Ibid., p.

ao.

6. Ibid., p. 25.

,
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supreme hea.a.· and infallible spokesman.

At his ordination,

eve-ry priest now receives tlle Holy Spirit from the Church

and carries it about as an object to be disposed of where
and ~hen he oees fit.

This Objectivism found its co1mter-pe.rt in Subjectivism. 7 Subjectivism was the r eaction against the fixed,
secure, disposable authority.
are freedom and spontaneity.

Its chief characteristics
To

e.ohieve its purpose, Sub-

jectivism held that the Spirit is never in any fashion
bound to any given Word of historical fact.

•only the in-

dividual can experience it (the Spirit), and only in his
solitary experience has he the certain1ty of the divine
revel ~tion.•8 Mysticism is the common name given to this
individualistic enthusiasm.
The moot beautiful and significant thing abo~t the
Reformation is the fact that through its interpreta tion of
the fiOrd the Church found an escape from the deadly antithesis of Objeotivism-Subje·o tivism.

The Reformation dis-

covered the all-important •secret of moving both beti:veen
and

beyond these extremea.•9
Its 1 epistemological 1 principle was the dialectic; that is, its form of expression was never the
use of one concept, but always t wo logically contradictory ones: the Word of God in the Bible and
the witness of the Holy Spirit, but these understood

?. Object-Subject, Objectivity-Subjectivity, ObjectivismSubjectivism are a.11 interchangeable terms in Brunner's vocabulary.
8. E~il Brunner, .sm,• .£!1., P• 28.
9. Ibid., p. 39.
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and experienced, not as a duality, but as a
unity.l.O
The truths of salvation and revelation are clearly discov~rable and available in the nord of Scripture, but they
are never available, willy-nilly, at the Church's command
in doctrine or dogma.

Salvation and revelation are avail-

able only as the Word of the ever living Spirit of God
through whom Obrist Incarnate takes possession of our
hearts and dwells there.

The secret of the Reformation is

contained in uthe paradoxical unity of Word and Spirit, of
historical revelation and God's contemporary presence, of
'Christ for us• a-nd 1 0hriat in ua•. 1111 It was Luther who
discovered. this great secret and in doing so, he refound
the original Biblical understanding of truth.
But this liberating purity in thecomprehension of
Biblical truth lasted for only a short time.

In the con-

troversies that inevitably followed the braak with Rome,
the Protestant controversialists already began reverting
back to Catholicism, though quite unconsciously.

They needed

something tangiable, fast, secure and apprehendable in their
argumentations and so they resorted to the Word ae an authoriative object.

Before long the ~ord of God was again made

compassable and objective doctrine became the object of
faith.

The fatal age in which this took place h~e been given

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
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the fitting appellation: The Age of Protea·t ant Orthodoxy.
\1hat precisely happened in this age!

Brunner tells us:

The paradoxical unity of \'lord and Spirit fell
to pieces; the Scriptures became a gathering of
divine oracles, the essence of divlnely r evealed
doctrine. ~e n ~ God's Word•••• the temptation could not be withstood to create a system of
assurances including the confessional dogma, the
notion of verbal inspiration, and the Bible understood as a book of revealed doctrine. The 'paper
· Pope' stands over against the Pope in Rome; quite
unnoticed the position of dependence on the Word
of God is usurped by the appeal to pure doctrine,
which in turn is made tantamount to the Word of
God. Thia displacement Qan already be noticed in
a decisive way in the Augsburg Confession, even
though Jtill hidden by a living understanding of
faith. 1
.
A

reaction to this deterioration in the understanding

of f a ith was bound to follow.

simply Pietiem.
j ectivism.

The counterstroke was termed

It bore tlithin itself various marks of Sub-

Even so it was an honest effort to bring the

individual back to the living, robust faith of the Bible.
'l1l1e successes it accomplished in the rejuvenation of the

Chu.rob, in social and 111issionary activities are among the
finest recorded in the history of the Ohurch.

With Schlei-

erm&cher, llo\"1ever, there began an extreme subjective interpretation of faith that no longer recognized any_foundation
for faith outside of immediate experience.

This subjective

dissolution offaith continued until lt reached lts apex
in the American psychology of religion, so that for many

Ia.

Ibid., 3lf.
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•theologians• there was :nothing left of religion except
a certain social feeling or value experience.
The First ~orl4 War swept away the very foundation
sands of this cheap, hallowed-out •theology.•

Powerful

t

reactionary movements which reverted back to the Bible,
1uther and the Reformation took the stage.

Perhaps the

greatest opponent of Subjectivity in the last generation
arose in the form of 11 d1o.lect1c theology."

But at the

same time, in avoiding the Scylla of Subjectivism, maey
began to veer too closely to the Charybdis of O~jectivism.
In the controversies that marked the theological transi""!'
tion period after the First world War, many a theologian
wanted more manageable, ready-made, massive weapons to
fight with

than the dialectically oscillating and organfopara.bolic notions in th·e Bible itself. 1113 Quite una,vares
8

a neo-Orthodox . theology took shape carrying many of the
essential features of Objectiviem, such as:

over-emphasis

on doctrine, dogma and the formulated creeds; and too much
prominence given to the objective factor in preaching and
in the understanding of the Church and tlle Sacraments.
Such is the brief but grim story of how the Church has persistently vascillated between the t ·,vo extremes of Subjectivism and ~bjectivism to its own great hurt and harm•
.!laturally,

upon first thought it would seem tlla t the

solution of ibis problen1 of finding Ch1·istian truth Hould
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lie somewhere between these two extremes.

It is only a

problem of defin-ing the proper sphere and thus simply a
question of mediati~n.

But such is decidedly not the

oaseJ

One glance o.t history, particularly the Reformation, will
sho~ that such a compromise can at best only obscure the
solution to the problern.

Brunner defini tel1 states: "There

is no middle vay between Objectivism and Subjectivism:
there is no correct 1nean between two errors. ul-4 The tre-

mcmdous damage done to the Church is not the result of overe111phasizing either extreMe.

It is rather the consequence

of the more funda.Jnental error that the Biblical revelation
~as brought under this antithesis at all.

For:

The Bible is as litt~e concerned uith objective
as with subjective truth. The Objective-Subjective
antithesis cannot be applied .to the ijord of God and
faith. It is a category of thought wholly foreign,
not only to the way of expression in the Bible, but
also to the entire content.15
:nia.t then according to Brunner is the Biblical understanding of truth? . It is truth as •God-truth'' apprehended
and comprehended only in faith.

0

In faith,u says Brunner,

nman possesses no truth except God's, and his possession
is not of the kind whereby one ordinarily possesses a truth,
but personal fellowship.ul8

This fellowship, of course, be-

gins when man believes God's self-revelation to
~-~ord.

in His

It starts \Vllen "an encounter takeg place between i2!1

14. Ibid., p. 40.
15. Ibid., P• 41.
16.

man

1l2JJ1. , p. 74.
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.!!.!!51 man.•17 Unique Christian and Biblical truth happens at
the mo1:ient of this encounter.

It is truth so unique that

it cannot possibly be expressed by any sort of Object-Subject
antithesis.

Its constant theme is "personal encounter• with

God, "personal correspondence" with God.

Its only analogy

lies in the encounter between human beings ~hen one p~rson
meets another.

Here a rather lengthy quote.tion is necessary

to understand just ~hat Brunner means by •parsonal encounter•
and

the "I-Thou relationship."

The encounter between two h''1m&n baings is ordinarily not personal at all but more or leas impersonal. I see 'someone.• To aee somem11,. is not essentially different from seeing something. This
someone says something to me. Someone saying •something' to me is not essentially different from my
saying 1 something 1 to myself - that is, thinking.
But now let us put the oase that this someone does
not say •something• but \ays' himself, discloses
himself to rr.e, and that I, \'lhile he I says' himself
to me, 'hear himself'; and more, that trhile he discloses himself to me, and so surrenders himself to
me, I disclose myaelf to him a.nd receive him while
I surrender myself to him. In this rt1ome11t he ceases to be for J?Ie a •someone-something' and bccomas
a 'Thou.• In th&t moment in wllioh he becomes a
'Thou• he ceases tq be an ::>bject of my thinking and
transforms the Object-subject relation into a relation of personal correspondence: we have fellowship together.is
·
In the sa:ne way, ,1hen I stand opposite Ood and am faoe
to face vii th Him tiho is never "something" but purely 11 Thou, a
I have nothing to reveal or disclose or think.

11

He alone

is Discloser.ul9 And he does not disclose "something"
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 85f.
19. Ibid., p. 87.

'
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about Himself, that ia, mere knowledge, but He discloses
Himself.

He personally meet~ me.

In personally meeting

me my r7hole •1 11 exititence ie overthrown.

I become com-

pletely c~nged because my "I" solitariness has been broken into.

I ·now have God Himself.

thingH or an "object• about Go~ .

I do not have •someAs Brunner clinches it:

"The antithesis between Object and Subject, between •something truthful' and 'knowledge of this truth' has disappeared and has been replaced by the purely peraonal meeting bet ween the accos ting God. and a nswering man. 1130

It is possible to attack Brunner and his "dl'f'ine-human
encounter" thesis by employing various different Biblical
approaches.

This becomes increasingly evident when we note

that his thesis a,gain leads him to deny the authority of
the Scriptures alor, with their verbal inspiration and infallibility.al

It is this denial of the authority

or

the

Scriptures tha.t r eP.ul t s in his semi-mystical vie?1 of the
Hie "divine-human encounter" theme also enduces him
, to confuse justification and aanotifio&tion, 32 and to comingle Law and Gospel all &long the line. 23 Furthermore ,
~Vord.

one mi ght from a purety secular point of view seriously
que s tion whether Brunner is himself consis tent witll his
.
denial of the Object-Subject antitheeis in his unders t anding
20. Ibid., p. 89.
21. Qt. JJ!!.g_., pp. l ?lf.
22 • .Q!.. ~ - , pp. lOOf and 155f.
33 • .Q!. especia.lly ibid., pp. 118f.

■
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and definition of.:faith.24
But, as before stated, our main purpose and objection
is to show t~t Dr. Brunner has no right as

a strict

Christ-

ian theologian to investigate and define the very. essence
of faith and the personal·- revelation of God to man.

It is

our purpose further to demonstrate that when he does so in
his Divine-Human Encounter, he is already playing the distinct role of a philosopher and not of a theqlogian.

Be

is employing his third and forbidden use (-rationalistic use)
of reason.

In doing so he transgresses the very •personal

centre• of man's existence, a ~phere in which he himself
says that a total correction 0£ Go~ for man must take place.
In his Foreword to lAI, Divine-Buman Encounter, Dr. Emil
Brunner makes the bold assertion:
of truth is: truth as encounter.• 25

•The Biblical conception
We wholly disagree with

w

24. ~- this statement of Brunner•s in Revelation
Reason, p. 180f.: . • ••• the absolute union with the historic
Mediator and the historical Word concerning Him,and with the
act of atonement which has taken place once and for all on
the Cross. The distinctive mark of this kind of knowledge,
as contrasted with all other kinds of knowledge, is that it
combines historical obiectiv1tY with a knowledge which is
subjective and present.
In other words; the same faith which states that 'Christ
is in me• is also the simple faith of the Bible, faith in .2l!;1ective facts, in this actual Book, which I have here before
me, and in that historical fact which once happened, at a.
particular time and place. And, indeed, these objective facts
are not, as they are in mysticism, merely •occasions,' or
starting points, which we can leave behind as soon as we reach
•reality,• the mystical experience of Christ; but faith in
Christ is permanently a~ absolutely bound up with those
objecJive facts, with this Book, and with this historical
fact. (Underlining my own.)
as. Emil Br~nner, Iwt Divine-Buman Encounter, p. ?.
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him and stoutly maintain that the Bible never essentially
defines ~he concept of trujh, this event of the personal revelation of God to man that is faith. 26 Daniel D. i illiams
speaking about this revelation that is faith expressly declares;

There are., indeed, many notions about revelation;
but no definition of it.• 37 Brunner must be aware of this
11

himself for he states:
Even if we brought together and analyzed exegetically all the Biblical passages in which the
,vord 'truth' occurs, we should be hardly a step
nearer our goal. Just as the Bible explicates
no 'principle of interpretation' and contains no
1 doctrine of the 'ilord of God,• so i18 search- it
in vain for a 'doctrine of truth. 1 The more formal a theological concept is, the less it can be
directly discovered or validated by the Bible itself.as
Yet in the very n~xt paragraph, Brunner claims the
right to investigate and make dogma.tic statements about the
"Biblical" under~tanding ot truth and faith.

This action

is possible because, as he mainta ins, ·these concepts of his
••are taken f~om nothing but Scripture itself and stand in
the closest connection to all its central contenta.•39 Tha
situation becomes more confusing when we continue with his
next sentence:

"They (his concepts) are in fact none other

than these very contents (of Scripture), considered in their
formal aspect, which as such are. never directly mentioned
as. Le·s t there be some misunderstanding, :•Biblical truth•
and faith are for Brunner one of the same.
27. Daniel n. Williams, m!.• .£U., p. 251.
as. Emil Brunner, .sm,. ill•, p. 45.
29. ll!isl• t P• 46.
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1n the Biblical word.• 30

Evidently the crux for solving

this apparent contradiction between these oonoepts not being
8

direotly mentioned in the Biblical word,• and these con-

cepts being utaken from nothing but Scripture itself• lies
in his' phrase:

•considered in their formal aapeot." ·Still

and all, we cannot see how this solution gives him the right
authoritatively to project a definition of faith which is
never warranted by Scripture.
~here then does Emil Brunner really get his definition
of Biblical truth and faith as the •personal encounter bet aeen God and ma.nu!

He himself gives us a helpful hint as

to its source when he discusses the Objective-Subjective
antithesis as the age old criterion for discovering truth
in general.

He goes on to say:

It was left for the newest form of philosophy,
the existential, to question the validity of the
antithesis itself. It is no accident that the
source of this -new thinking is to. be found in the
greatest -Ohristian thinker of- modern times, Soren
Kierkegaard. It is therefore particularly suggestive for us theologian~ to attach ourselves
to this philosophy, the entire bent of which seems
to correspond with ours.31
Though Dr. Brunner hastly covers up by immediately asserting:
Yet we must emphasize again that our considerations are purely theological., that thence they
are not dependent on the correctness or incorrectness of that philosophical undertaking which seems
to rj! parallel - apparently or really - to our
own.

99

our suspicions are already quite aroused.

Daniel D. Wil-

lia.ms gives us the cue that leads directly to Brunner•a
source for truth as encounter betweon God and man when he
states:

"It comes fro)Jl a general conception of the nature

of personal relations which has been given classic eZl)ression in Martin Buber's ,lms,~.• 33 Buber's philo•ophical world view rests on the distinction between two s~parate kinds of relations: those between persons, characterized by
"I-it.n

II

I~'l'hou, " and those between things,. defined by
In order to arrive at this di~tinotion, Martin

Buber analyzed the constitutive elements in personal relations, whose distinguishing features seem to be: •the freedom of ea.oh person, the replacement of all objectivity by
interpersonal subjectivity, the absence of the will to control the other, the appreciation of the other's worth as
a personal o~jeot. 1 34
Brunner has borrowed this pattern of encounter between person and person and applied it to the encounter
between God and man, or in a word, applied it to faith.
Therefore, as Daniel ijilliams points out:

"'l'he event --"hioh

ia supposed to· transcend all philosophical under.standing is
described by the use. of a philosophical structure, drawn
from hwnan exper.1 ence- and subject to the criticism by the
methods of philosophical analysi~.• 35 Brunner is well
33. Da.niel D. Williama, 12£. Qll.
34. !!artin Buber, .l and 'l'hou, cited by Daniel \1illi1µDB,

12£. ill• .

35. leM,.
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aware of this vulnerability to criticism. and struggles mightily to overcome it.

He atresaes the fact that the encounter

of person with person is only a poor analogy of the real
thing. 3 8 A more subtle cover-up is recognized in his repeated terming of Kierkegaard, ~artin Buber and his other
creditors as · nobristiann and 1 Biblical 8 tbinkera.37 Here
is one example:
It was as a Christian philosopher that Kierkegaard created the 'Existential' philosophy, it
was as a Christian thinker that Ebner discovered
the theme of 'I-Thou• - no Greek, however great
a genius, would have ever understood such a theme it was as a Biblical thinker that Martin Buber recognized the significance of the contrasts between
1 I 1 and 1 It,• Tz• and 1 '1'hou.•3B
Finally, however, the choice is plain.

Either the the-

ologian must relinquish all investigation concerning the
very essence of faith and his attempt to speak about it intel~igibly because the Bible· speaks only of fruits and
sulta of faith, or he must cease to be a theologian.

n-

Only

as a philosopher can he examine the epistemological foundations and the actual originations of faith, and he can't
do that with any authority.

About these mysterious, super-

natural questions that the Bible does not answer, the humble and contrite Christian will not concern himself.

He

36. ,gt. as an example, this statement of Emil Brunner•s
in l:a!,Divine-Human Encounter, p. 85: •Yet we are dealing
only with an analogy seen in an exception to the usual occurance •••• •
37. le aren't discussing or questioning the Christianity
of these men.. We are only saying that their writings definitely . portray them much more as philosophers than as theologians.
38. Emil Brunner, 141!1 in Revolt, P• 546.
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will be fully satisfied with Obrist•a injunction expressed
time and again:

"Wherefore by their fruits :,,shall know

them. 11 39 Thus we oonolude ·with 1niill1ams:
••• the theologian (Brunner, of course) who has
spent his life in an effort to free Christian theology from entanglement with mysticism and with
philosophy has in his own theology developed a
perspective which embodies a philosophical mysticism whose ~lassie ezponent is a philoso'Dher
who does not depend on the Neg Testament.40
For three parallel reasons then we mu&t object to the
Brunneria.n doctrines on the relationship between revelation
and reason and the idea of Christian philosophy that springs
fro1n this rela tionship.

These reasons are again: First, he

allows reason to sit in judgement over revelation and its
Ca nonical authority.
is philosophical.

Second, his whole dialectical epproach

And third, his •divine-human encounter•

principle for the 1 Biblic&l" understanding of truth and
faith is philosophical and vio1ates his own law of the "personal centre. 11

These three reasons furthermore necessitate

his break between revelation and reason already between
f a ith and theology, and not between theology and philosophy
where it properly belongs.
There are no more fitting words to conclude this investigation of 8 Enlil Brunner and his· Idea of Ohristtan Philosophy• than the almost classic ones of John P. Clelland
39. Matthew 7:20, .sz,t. also: Matthew 7:16ff; 13:33 and
John 15:4; 15:16.
40. Daniel D. flilliams, loo. £11•
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appearing in bis revia~ of B:runner•s Revelation and Reason:
It is our conclusion tha t despite his desire
to work outward from revelation to reason, Brun-,
ner has failed to do so beoause he himself is
a rationalist. God Almighty has spoken in the
Sor1ptures, and in refusing to listen to His
voice Dr. Brunner has asse~ted the autonomy of
his rea son. Iiis lea.rn1ng is ma.ssive, but oh,
for the childlike faith of a Samuel to say,
"Speak, Lord, for thy servant beareth. 11 41

41. John P. Olell~nd, •Review of Emil Brunner•s Revelation and Reason,' in The Wet ins er Theological Journal. Vol. X, .No. 1, (November, ·1941 , P• 61.
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